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Chapter 1
Introduction
Natural selection favours the genes which are able to introduce replicates of themselves in
the next generation with higher certainty than do rival genes (Hamilton 1963). The fitness
of an individual, it’s ability to produce future parents, depends on it’s own behaviour as
well as on the behaviour of other individuals in the population. For instance, the intensity
of competition an individual experience depends on the exploitation of resources by neigh-
bours. The fitness is thus frequency dependent on what neighbours do. Behaviours can be
classified according to the costs and benefits they have on the fitness of the behaver and
it’s neighbours (Hamilton 1964, Hamilton 1975). According to this classification there exist
four distinct social behaviours. (1) A gene confering the ability to use a new ressource is
called selfish because it has a positive effect on the bearer of the gene but a negative effect
on neighbours by the concomitant increase in competition. (2) An altruistic behaviour is
defined as an action where an individual increases the fitness of a neighbour at the expense
of it’s own. The effect is deleterious for the actor but positive for the receptor. (3) More
surprinsingly, an individual might sacrifice a fraction of it’s ressources to harm another at
no direct benefits. This spitefull behaviour incurs a cost for the actor but is also deleterious
for the receptor. (4) Finally a cooperative behaviour breeds benefits for both actors and
neighbours.
In this thesis I will continue on the path traced by numerous evolutionnary biologist which
attempt to fine tune our understanding of the evolution of social behaviours since Hamilton’s
foundation (1963, 1964). A critical development over the last 40 years has been the realisa-
tion that competition between kin can partly or completely cancel out the role of relatedness
as an agent favouring altruism (Wilson et al., 1992; Taylor, 1992a,b). Of importance is thus
to determine the scale at which competition and altruism occur. One mechanism avoiding
the complete dilution of relatedness by competition is the conditionnal expression of the
social behaviors. Focus will be given in this thesis at the role played by different recognition
mechanism in paving the way to altruism (Komdeur and Hatchwell, 1999) when the popu-
lation has a spatial structure. Further, the evolution of spite will also be considered in these
settings.
The thesis is fractionated into two parts. First, different models promoting altruism coop-
eration and spite will be compared under the same theoretical umbrella. This is a rather
informal and more personnal part of my thesis. It also serve as a justification and basis
to ”Altruism among kin and non-kin individuals” which is an article attempting to clas-
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sify the mechanisms leading to altruism and cooperation. Second, in the annexe, there are
three research papers about kin selection, altruism and dispersal: ”Is sociality driven by the
costs of dispersal or the benefits of philopatry?: A role for kin-discrimination mechanism”,
”Altruism, dispersal and phenotype kin recognition” and ”Inbreeding avoidance through kin
recognition: choosy female boost male dispersal” this last paper incorporates kin recognition
as an agent favoring sex-biased dispersal.
Chapter 2
One shot interactions
The probability of fixation method
The measure of selection
To study the evolution of a social behaviour, one needs a measure of fitness to determine
the best strategy in the frequency dependent social context. Different approaches have
been proposed in the literature to find evolutionnary stable strategies. I prefer the the
direct fitness approach (Taylor and Frank, 1996) as given by the probability of fixation
method (Rousset, 2003a) because it clearly splits up the effect of drift and selection, links
the phenotypic to the population genetic approach of game theory, sticks relatedness to
coalescent theory and is based on a minimal number of clear cut assumptions.
In a finite population, drift has a strong effect on gene frequency change such that a strategy
which is very likely to be observed in the long run is a strategy with a high probability of
fixation. The method computes the probability of fixation of a single new A mutant allele
appearing in a resident population of a alleles. The phenotype of the resident is za and the
mutant deviates by a small magnitude such that zA = za + δ. A candidate ESS for the
phenotype under interest is found by maximizing the probability of fixation of the mutant
allele. This turns out to be the exact inclusive fitness measure when mutants have small
effects (of first order) on fitness. The derivative of the probability of fixation with respect
to a small deviation is given by (Rousset 2003a)
φ = E◦
( ∞∑
t=0
E
(
d∆pt
dδ
))
, (2.1)
where pt is the frequency of the A allele at time t and E◦ denotes the expectation over
realisation of pt in the neutral process. The expectation in the sum is the mean effect of the
mutation on gene frequency change over one generation. The sum makes the balance over
the neutral process of the mutant’s negative and positive effects on gene frequency change
over the whole time of invasion. Under an explicit population structure such as an island
model of dispersal or a stepping-stone model of dispersal, the derivative of the probability
of fixation becomes
3
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φ = lim
µ→0
S
1−QD0
, (2.2)
where µ stands for the mutation rate and QD0 is the identity of two homologous genes
randomly sampled from two individuals after dispersal in the same deme. The measure of
selection S is the sum of the effects of actors (including the focal individual himself) on a
focal receptor’s fitness w weighted by genetic similarity (Frank and Taylor 1996)
S =
∂w
∂z•
+
∑
j
∂w
∂zj
Qj . (2.3)
The Qj ′s are the identities of two randomly sampled homologous genes, one from the FI
and one from a class j member. In the present study j will mainly refer to some distance
(j = 0 stands for two genes sampled in the same deme). All derivatives are evaluated at
(z• = z0 = ... = z), where z• is the phenotype of the focal individual (FI), zj is the phenotype
of a class j actors who potentially affect the focal’s individual fitness and z is the candidate
ESS. The direction of selection is given by the sign of the derivative of the probability of
fixation φ which is equivalent to the sign of the selection measure S. Depending on the
model under study I will use the former or the latter.
Using the property that the partial derivatives of the fitness function sum to zero at (z• =
... = z): ∂w∂z• +
∑
j
∂w
∂zj
= 0 (Rousset 2000), we substract this sum pre-multiplyed by the
factor QD0 from S in (2.2), yielding after rearrangement
φ = lim
µ→ 0
 ∂w
∂z•
1−QD0
1−QD0
+
∑
j
∂w
∂zj
Qj −QD0
1−QD0

=
∂w
∂z•
+
∑
j
∂w
∂zj
Rj , (2.4)
where the non trivial limit Rj = limµ→0
Qj−QD0
1−QD0
is a local measure of relatedness, it compares
the genetic identity at distance j to the identity of genes within demes after dispersal.
In the case of diploid individuals ”1” must be replaced by the identity of two randomly
choosen gene from the same individual with replacement. Note that there is no particular
biological relevance in using the identity QD0 in the comparison factor. To calculate the
candidate ESS we can use any type of comparison factor as long as the non trivial limit exist
because different comparison factor introduces differences in (2.4) only up to a multiplicative
constant.
Reproductive costs and benefits
In this thesis I will mainly concentrate on the evolution of altruism so let us designate zR0 as
the average altruistic phenotype in the focal deme of a focal individual (FI). Generally, zR0 is
the level of investment into altruism, zR0 ∈ (0, 1). An individual coming to life has one unit
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of reproductive power allowing him to produce a huge number of offsprings. Interactions
with other individuals will change this baseline reproductive potential. An altruistic act
with investment zR0 destroyes C(z
R
0 ) units of reproductive potential and creates B(z
R
0 ) new
units. The average units of reproductive potential (fecundity) per individual in the deme
is thus 1 + B(zR0 ) − C(zR0 ). Explicit benefit and cost functions can be considered in order
to derive a canditate ES level of investment into altruism (Killingback and Doebeli, 2000;
Perrin and Lehmann, 2001). However, for simplicity, I will mainly evaluate selection between
an allele a (phenotype za = 0) that does not express altruism and an allele A that engages
into the behavior with intensity δ (phenotype zA = δ). Otherwise stated, selection will thus
be evaluted near δ = 0 which implies that the derivatives are taken at (z• = z0 = ... = 0).
We look at the effect of actors on the probability of fixation of an altruistic gene lineage
in a resident population of selfish individuals. This procedure allows us to get simpler
analytical expressions without loss of generality. Under this setting, the number of units of
reproductive potential per individual in a focal deme is written 1 +B zR0 − C zR0 . Altruism
involves a cost C (i.e., it results in the donor having C fewer offspring) and a benefit B
(i.e., it results in the recipient having B more offspring). It is useful to note that the mean
phenotype in the focal deme can be split into two components
zR0 =
1
N
z• +
N − 1
N
zD0 , (2.5)
where zD0 is the average phenotype the focal deme excluding the FI, i.e the average phenotype
between different individuals. The phenotype of the FI has an effect of weight 1/N on the
mean phenotype of the population. This decomposition has a direct link with the identity
of two randomly sampled individuals with replacement in a deme of N adults given by
QR0 =
1
N
+
N − 1
N
QD0 . (2.6)
With probability 1/N the same individual is sampled twice and with complementary prob-
ability two different individual are sampled.
There is a strict link between phenotypes and identity coefficients (Rousset, 2003a) such
that phenotypes can be splitted according to the splitting of genetic identity or vice versa.
Phenotypes of adults and of juveniles will be used in the following, we denote the former by
the superscript R so that zRi designates the phenotype of a randomly choosen adult actor at
distance i. The phenotype of a randomly choosen juvenile actor at distance i will be written
zi. Accordingly, QRi and Qi refer respectively to genetic identity among adults and among
juveniles. The calculation and link between these coancestries is done in appendix 3.1 for a
population structured into nd demes linearly arrayed on a circle.
Hamilton’s rule
Given some life-cycle, the reproductive costs and benefits allow us to calculate the fitness
function w which is the expected number of adult offspring of the FI. The partial derivatives
in (2.4) are the effects of different actors on the expected number of adult offsprings of the
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FI (Rousset, 2003a). The first partial derivative can be treated as a cost −c ≡ ∂w∂z• because
this is the effect of the FI on its expected number of adult offsprings. The remaing partial
derivatives can be treated as benefits bj ≡ ∂w∂zj because these are the effects of different
actors on the FI’s fitness. Cancelling (2.4), selection favors the trait under interest if
∑
j
Rj bj − c > 0. (2.7)
In the presence of different classes of actors one can not simply recover Hamilton’s rule
(1964) because individuals from different classes have different effects on the FI’s fitness and
the effect of each class must be weighted by the appropriate relatedness measure. However,
when the FI interacts solely with two classes of individuals as for instance in the island model
of dispersal (the classes are individuals from the same deme or from different demes, see
below) or when interaction occur among members of a familly (the classes are for instance
siblings and non-siblings, see below) it is possible to recover Hamilton’s rule
Rb− c > 0. (2.8)
Where b is the effect of one of the two classes on the FI’s fitness and the relatedness R
compares the identity of gene of the FI with that class relative to the identity of genes with
the other class. Whether a behaviour qualifies as altruistic, spiteful, selfish or cooperative
depends on the sign of c and b (Hamilton, 1970; Rousset, 2003c). Altruism is defined by
c > 0 and b > 0, spite is defined by c > 0 and b < 0 the behaviour is deleterious for both
the actor and the receptor, cooperation is defined by c < 0 and b > 0 and finally a selfish
behaviour occurs when c < 0 and b < 0.
The fitness costs and benefits (partial derivatives) can be complex functions of the life
cycle so that one have to check the sign of them to classify properly the behaviour under
consideration. However, in order to compare different models one wish to encapsulate all
variables of the life cycle into a single coefficient r. This can be done for example when
altruism involves a fecundity cost of C fewer offspring and a fecundity benefit of B more
offspring as seen in the previous section, then (2.8) can be rearranged into the condition
r B − C > 0. (2.9)
This ”pseudo Hamilton’s rule” gives exactly the same condition as the properly defined
Hamilton’s rule (2.8). However, instead of looking at the effect on fitness we look at the
effect on fecundity squeezing all the variables of the life-cycle into the single coefficient
r =
Qs −Qc
1−Qc , (2.10)
where Qs is the genetic identity of the focal individual with its social neighborhood and Qc is
the genetic identity of the focal individual with its competitive neighbourhood, (this last term
is usually called the economic neighbourhood but it actually refers to the effects of individuals
which are in competition with the FI). The relatedness coefficient r has been defined by
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Queller (1992), below I will refer to r as the relatedness with the social neighbourhood.
The two genetic identities Qs and Qc might be complexe functions of different other type
of identities and/or of variables of the life-cycle (dispersal, survival, size of groups, size of
demes, ...) but unless the effect of different classes of individuals on the fecundity of the FI
are described by different functions, one can switch from (2.7) to (2.10).
An interesting feature of (2.9) is that the relatedness with the social neighborhood can be
negative if individuals are more related in competitive than in social interactions. In that
case, it is sufficient to replace the benefit by a damage B ≡ −D in (2.9) so that the condition
for the evolution of a damaging behaviour is given by
−r D − C > 0. (2.11)
Whether the behaviour will qualify as spite depends on the effect of actors on the fitness of
the FI, therefore the signs of the partial derivatives in (2.7) must be checked.
Weak and strong altruism
In order to get a feeling about the mechanisms which might sustain altruism it is important
first to know under what condition altruism is counter-selected. For instance, in a panmictic
population under random interactions the well known one shot Prisonner’s dilemma shows
that no investment into cooperation will be favored by natural selection. Further, Taylor
(1992a) showed that the presence of genetical ties in a structured population sustain altruism
only insofar as the actor gets a share of the benefits created by its own altruistic act. This
form of altruism is therefore to weak to explain the sterility of workers and since it involves
proper self-sacrifice. As a start, let us now derive Taylor’s result with the present approach.
Weak altruism
The infinite island model of dispersal
The setting of Taylor’s 1992a model of altruism is the infinite island model of dispersal.
Creatures are assumed to be haploid and annual, the fitness function w is computed accord-
ing to the events of the life cycle occuring in the following order. (1) Social interactions
take place among adults. An altruistic act involves a cost C (i.e., it results in the donor
having C fewer juveniles) and a benefit B (i.e., it results in the recipient having B more
juveniles). (2) Breeding occurs, each adult produces a large number of juveniles and dies.
(3) A fraction m of juveniles disperse randomly to another deme. (4) Among all juveniles
competing on a local patch, N individuals access to adulthood.
The fecundity of the FI reads 1 + B zR0 − C z• because it pays the cost of its own behavior
and receives the help from each cooperator in the deme including himself. A fraction (1−m)
of the juveniles of the FI enter in competitiom in the natal deme with (1−m) non-dispersing
and m dispersing juveniles. The complementary fraction m of juveniles of the FI compete in
some distant deme. The average number of competing juveniles produced in the residency
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deme of the FI is 1 + (B − C) zR0 and 1 + (B − C) zR1 is the average number of competing
juveniles produced by different demes (considered all at distance 1). Collecting terms gives
the fitness function
w =
(1−m) (1 +B zR0 − C z•)
(1−m) (1 + (B − C) zR0 )+m (1 + (B − C) zR1 ) + m
(
1 +B zR0 − C z•
)
1 + (B − C) zR1
. (2.12)
Inserting (2.12) into (2.3), reminding that zR0 =
1
N z• +
N−1
N z
D
0 and noting that in the
infinite island model of dispersal QR1 = 0, the selection measure reads
S =
∂w
∂z•
+
∂w
∂zD0
QD0 . (2.13)
Evaluating the derivatives at (z• = zD0 = z
R
1 = 0), replacing the identity between different
individual by its equilibrium value QD0 =
(1−m)2
1+m (2−m) (N−1) (appendix 3.2), cancelling the
selection measure and rearranging yields the condition for an increase in altruism
B
N
− C > 0. (2.14)
In terms of (2.9) the relatedness with the social neighborhood is r = 1/N , this is the fraction
of the benefits created by the altruistic of the actor that flow back to him. This type of
altruism has been labeled ”weak ” altruism (Mittledorf and Wilson, 2000) because the
focal individual increases the fecundity of its neighboors by increasing its own reproductive
potential. Nevertheless, it can be shown that ∂w∂z• < 0 and
∂w
∂zD0
> 0 so that this behaviour
strictly qualifies as altruistic (Rousset 2003b).
The finite island model of dispersal
In the finite island model the population is structured into nd demes of size N . The life-cycle
is the same as in the preceding section, the only difference is that dispersing juveniles of the
FI are in competition with a fraction 1/(nd − 1) of dispersing juveniles stemming from the
residency deme of the FI. The fitness function then becomes:
w = f•
 (1−m)
(1−m) fR +mfD +
m
(1−m) fD +m
(
1
nd−1 fR +
nd−2
nd−1 fD
)
 . (2.15)
The fecundity of the FI is:
f• = 1 +B zR0 − C z•. (2.16)
The number of competing juveniles produced by the adults in the residency deme of the FI
reads:
fR = 1 + (B − C) zR0 . (2.17)
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Finally, the number of competing juveniles produced by adults from different demes is:
fD = 1 + (B − C) zR1 . (2.18)
Note that the fecundity f• takes into account the effect of actors on the FI’s fecundity,
these are the actors of the social neighbourhood. By contrast fR and fD take into account
all the effects of actors on the number of competing juveniles, these are the actors of the
competitive neighbourhood which might include the FI himslef. Using the property that
the partial derivatives of the fitness function sum to one and cancelling ∂w
∂zR1
from S =
∂w
∂z•
+ ∂w
∂zD0
QD0 +
∂w
∂zR1
QR1 , the direction of selection is given by Hamilton’s rule
S ∝ ∂w
∂z•
+
∂w
∂zD0
RD0 (2.19)
where RD0 =
QD0 −QR1
1−QR1
is explicitly obtained by using the coancestries calculated in appendix
(2.2). After simplification S ∝ −C+ BN − B−CN nd , cancelling the equation, rearranging in order
to obtain a condition of the form (2.9), the relatedness with the social neighborhood reads
r =
nd − 1
N nd − 1 . (2.20)
As expected, we recover (2.14) when nd →∞. In this thesis I am interested in the evolution
of a stronger form of altruism when the altruistic move has only a negative effect on the
fecundity of the FI. I will now derive several models were strong altruism (designated as
altruism in the sequel) does not evolve.
Strong altruism
Under the strong form of altruism, the fecundity of the FI is written
f• = 1 +B zD0 − C z•, (2.21)
because it pays the cost of its own behavior and receives the help from each cooperator in the
deme excluding himself. However, the frequency of altruists in a deme remains equivalent
to the setting of weak altruism. Since each altruistic act destroys C units of reproductive
power and creates B additional units, the average fecundity of the residency deme of the FI
is still given by (2.17). Under strong altruism, only the distribution of reproductive potential
between social interactors is altered but not the mean fecundity of the focal deme since the
total number of altruistic acts remain unchanged:
fR = 1 +
1
N
(
B zD0 − C z•
)
+
N − 1
N
(
B
(
z•
N − 1 +
N − 2
N − 1 z
D
0
)
− C zD0
)
= 1 + (B − C)
(
1
N
z• +
N − 1
N
zD0
)
= 1 + (B − C) zR0 . (2.22)
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The second term of the left hand side in the first equality is the fecundity of the FI and the
third term is the fecundity of different individuals. The benefit created by the FI is shared
among N −1 individuals, excluding himself. The benefit created by different individuals are
also shared by N − 1 but individuals including the FI. Therefore, different individuals get
a share N−2N−1 of the benefits created by individuals excluding the FI. The mean fecundity of
different demes is also equivalent to the case of strong altruism (2.18)
fD = 1 + (B − C) zR1 . (2.23)
Substituting the fecundities (2.21), (2.22) and (2.23) into (2.15), using (2.19) as the selection
measure and simplifying
S ∝ −C − 1
N nd
(B − C). (2.24)
Both terms on the right are costs and altruism is coounter selected. It is interesting to see
that kin competition does even more than simply canceling out the benefits of altruism. The
first term in (2.24) is the cost due to the decrease in fecundity of the FI. The second term
in (2.24) is an additionnal cost stemming from the additionnal offsprings created by the
altruistic act which reinforce kin competition. This suggest that individual are in fact more
related in competitive than in social interactions. If we rearrange the equation to produce
the relatedness with the social neighborhood, this turns out to be negative
r =
−1
N nd − 1 . (2.25)
Substituting a reproductive damage for the reproductive benefit B ≡ −D in (2.24) the
condition for the evolution of the damaging behaviour is given by
D
N nd − 1 − C > 0. (2.26)
Which is of the form (2.11) and we can see that damaging neighbours is a good idea as long
as the total population size remains small. The FI gains at harming neighbours because
this reduces the competition for its offsprings. Therefore, the behaviour is selfish and not
spiteful. When the size of the population increases it becomes increasingly unlikely that the
FI destroys enough offspring from neighbours to reduce efficiently competition. Therefore,
in a population of large size (NT = N nd large) the damaging behaviour will not evolve.
Finally, how is the injure of the victims related to the investment into spite? Certainly by
diminishing return since a good punch is as good as a kill.
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Canceling altruism
The lattice model
In the last sections, we saw that a simple population structure does not favor the evolution
of altruism. This setting has been extended by Taylor (1992b) to the case of isolation by
distance between demes. The result following Taylor’s analysis is one of the most impor-
tant and counterintuitive concerning altruism because it shows that neither genetical ties
nor population viscosity are sufficient conditions to sustain its evolution. In the original
formulation there is only one individual per deme. In order to get a more general model I
now replicate the version of Rousset (2003c) which allows for arbitrary deme size. Further, I
exclude the FI as an actor on its own fecundity benefits, i.e, weak altruism. The population
consists of nd demes arrayed on a circle. The events of the life cycle occuring in the following
order. (1) Social interactions take place among adults. Actors in a deme have an effects
dj on the fecundity of individuals in the deme at distance j. The distribution of effects
of actors is therefore arbitrary. It encompasses pure local interactions (for instance help-
ing individuals in the same deme or an adjacent deme) or action at distance (for instance
damaging individuals in demes far away). (2) Breeding occurs, each adult produces a large
number of juveniles and dies. (3) Dispersal of juveniles occur. The dispersal distribution is
arbitrary but identical for individuals moving clockwise and counter-clockwise. It encom-
passes various degrees of isolation by distance such as the island model of dispersal or the
stepping-stone model of dispersal. (4) Among all juveniles competing on a local patch, N
individuals access to adulthood. The specific effect of the FI on itself is denoted by d• and
the fitness function for this model reads
w =
nd−1∑
i=0
mi
1 + d• z• + d0 zD0 +
∑nd−1
k>0 dk z
R
k∑nd−1
j=0 mi−j (1 +
∑nd−1
k=0 d
′
j−k z
R
k )
, (2.27)
where mi is the dispersal rate of juveniles of the FI at distance i and mi−j is the dispersal
rate of juveniles stemming from a deme at distance j from the residency deme of the FI
who compete with those juveniles. The effect of adults at distance j − k from the deme at
distance j on the productivity of this deme is designated by d′j−k. Therefore, these actors
on the fitness of the FI are situated at distance k from the residency deme of the FI (i.e, the
phenotype zRk ). Note that d
′
j = dj except d
′
0 = d• + d0. The measure of selection evaluated
at (z• = ... = 0) is
S = d• + d0QD0 +
∑
k>0
dkQ
R
k −
∑
i
∑
j
∑
k
mimi−j d′j−kQ
R
k . (2.28)
Since the demes are wrapped around a circle, the social effects and the dispersal rates at
distances i, −i, nd − i are all equivalent to distance i and we can write
∑
j
∑
k
d′j−kQ
R
k =
∑
j
∑
k
d′kQ
R
j−k. (2.29)
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Substituting (2.29) into (2.28) we have
S = d• + d0QD0 +
∑
k>0
dkQ
R
k −
∑
k
∑
i
∑
j
d′kmimi−j Q
R
j−k. (2.30)
We now use the following equalities from appendix (2.1): QRk = Q
D
k for all k > 0, the
recursion for adults Q
D
−k
γ =
∑
i
∑
jmimi−j Q
R
j−k and remind that d
′
0 = d• + d0, hence:
S = d• −
∑
k
dkQ
D
k +
∑
k
d′kQ
D
−k/γ
= d•
(
γ −QD0
)
γ
− 1− γ
γ
∑
k
dkQ
D
k
= d•
(
1−QD0
γ
− 1− γ
γ
)
− 1− γ
γ
∑
k
dkQ
D
k (2.31)
.
Finally, substituting (2.31) into (2.2) and noting that when mutation rate vanish QDk = 1
and 1−Q
D
0
1−γ = NT where NT = N nd is the total number of individuals in the population
(Nagylaki, 1983; Rousset, 2003c), the effect of the mutant on the probability of fixation
becomes
φ = d• − 1
N nd
(
d• +
∑
k
dk
)
. (2.32)
In terms of costs and benefits for the evolution of altruism (d• = −C and dk = Bk):
φ = −C − 1
N nd
(∑
k
Bk − C
)
, (2.33)
where Bk is the number of units of reproductive power gained with the help of individuals
at k steps apart from the natal deme. Helping neighbours in neighboring sites makes things
even worse for altruism. The result given by (2.33) emphasizes that the presence of genetical
ties (induced by some level of philopatry), the occurence of population viscosity (induced
by local dispersal) and local interactions (occuring if dj = 0 for j large) are unsufficient
conditions for altruism to be favored by natural selection. This result has been obtained
by simulation by Wilson et all. (1992) and analytically by Taylor (1992b) and is a major
finding about kin selection theory. This model might be treated as a null model for the
evolution of altruism.
An inspection of (2.33) reveals that it is again a good idea to harm neighbours in a population
of small size.
Randomly formed groups
In this section we investigate the evolution of altruism under the setting of temporary formed
groups of size n in a population of size N >> n (Hamilton, 1975; Wilson, 1977; Boyd and
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Richerson, 2001). Events of the life cycle occur in the following order. (1) Groups of size
n are randomly formed. (2) Social interactions occurs within groups. As previously, an
altruistic act involves a cost C (i.e., it results in the donor having C fewer juveniles) and a
benefit B (i.e., it results in the recipient having B more juveniles). (3) Breeding takes place,
each adult produces a large number of juveniles and dies such that groups are dissolved. (4)
Juveniles compete and N reach adulthood.
The fecundity of the FI in a group containing j other altruists is 1 +B zDj −C z• because it
pays the cost of its behavior and receives help from each cooperator in the group excluding
himself. The number of competing juveniles produced in the population is 1 + (B − C) zR0 .
Combining these terms, the expected number of adult offspring of the FI interacting in a
group of type j reads
wj =
1 +B zDj − C z•
1 +B zR0 − C zR0
, (2.34)
where zR0 =
1
N z• +
N−1
N z
D
0 . Note that each type of group is a different social environment
for the FI. The selection measure to use in this context is derived in appendix (3) and has
a form similar to (2.3). Since the partial derivatives sum to one we can cancel ∂wj
∂zR0
from
S = ∂wj∂z• +
∂wj
∂zD
j
Qg +
∂wj
∂zR0
QD0 which then reduces to
S ∝ ∂wj
∂z•
+
∂wj
∂zDj
Rg, (2.35)
where the relatedness Rg =
Qg−QD0
1−QD0
is a measure of the genetic identity within groups
relative to the mean population mean genetic identity. The genetic identity within groups
is Qg = a+ (1− a)QD0 where a is the level of assortative interactions, substituting this last
equation into the relatedness one get Rg = a. Under random group formation a = 0 and
only the effect of the FI on its fitness matters for selection
S ∝ −C − 1
nng
(B − C). (2.36)
No altruism evolves since (2.36) is a net cost. We saw previously that when the FI gets a
share from the benefits created by its own act, altruism evolve. We can introduce this effect
in the present model by simply adding an effect of order of the size of the group 1/n on the
benefits in (2.36), then
S ∝ 1
n
B − C − 1
nng
(B − C). (2.37)
Cancelling the selective pressure (2.37) and rewritting the equation in the form (2.9) the
relatedness with the social neighborhood is
r =
ng − 1
nng − 1 . (2.38)
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It is interesting to note that this equation has exactly the same structure as (2.20). In fact
the mechanism yielding to altruism are in fact exactly equivalent. Altruistic donations occur
at the level of the deme or of the group and competition occur at the level of the whole
population. This insures that the social and the competitive neighborhood are partially
disentangled as long as ng > 1 and nd > 1. A similar finding has been for cultural traits,
the work of Choi (2002, unpulished) emphasize that individuals must play locally and learn
globally.
Note that there is a qualitative difference between the model of weak altruism in the finite
island model of dispersal where the behaviour qualifies as strictly altruistic whereas in the
present model the behoviour is selfish. This occurs because the relatedness with the so-
cial neighborhood is obtained by cancelling the effect of the FI on himself ∂wj∂z• while the
relatedness Rg remains zero.
The social and the competitive neighbourhoods
Before moving to specific models leading to the evolution of altruism, we will first have a
closer look at the social neighbourhood (actors affecting the fecundity of the FI f•) and the
competitive neighbourhood (actors affecting the mean fecundity of the residency deme fR
and of different demes fD) for the island model of dispersal. This is necessary because only
lately I realised that there are some inconsistencies arising in Perrin and Lehmann (2001)
and Lehmann and Perrin (2002) when the trait under consideration is spite. Applying
their method would yield spite when spite is impossible. In fact, the terms counting the
effect of competing individuals on the fitness of the FI have been incorrectly computed and
are going lumpy. It is important to identify the correct effects of actors on the fitness of
the FI because altruism evolves only insofar the effect of the social neighbourhood (actors
creating additional offsprings) exceeds the effect of the competitive neighbourhood (actors
displacing offsprings). Note also that the competitive neighbourhood includes the FI itself
since helping neighbours might lead its own offsprings into trouble due to the concomitant
increase of competition.
Consider the life-cycle of the preceding sections. The FI processes resources, interact socially
and reproduces in a deme where it reached adulthood. This residency deme of the FI
might not be equivalent to its natal deme since individuals stay philopatric only up to
a given probability. However, the expression of altruism is homogeneous, altruistic acts
are performed equally when actors disperse or remain philopatric. There is no need to
consider explicitely these two cases but these are in in fact implicitely covered by using the
phenotypes among adults zD0 , z
R
0 and z
R
1 . This can be seen by expanding for instance the
average phenotype of different individuals
zD0 = (1−m) ((1−m) z0 +mz1)
+ m
(
(1−m) z1 + m
nd − 1 z0 +m
nd − 2
nd − 1 z1
)
. (2.39)
This equation breaks down the phenotype of different adults into the phenotype of juveniles
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and emphasis the distribution of actors between demes. The interpretation of the equation
is as follow: with probability (1 − m) the FI settled in its natal deme. Then, a fraction
(1−m) of juvenile reaching adulthood also stem from its natal deme (phenotype z0) and a
complementary fraction m come from different demes (phenotype z1). With probability m
the FI dispersed and settled in a foreign deme where a fraction 1/(nd − 1) of the migrants
reaching adulthood stem from from its natal deme. The phenotype zR1 can also be splitted.
It is interesting to see that this expansion is equivalent to the splitting of genetic identity be-
tween different adults after dispersal into the genetic identity between juveniles right before
dispersal (appendix (2.2)). The relevance of splitting phenotypes occur only when altruism
is no longer expressed homogeneously but conditionally. For instance, individuals might ex-
press altruism only when philopatric and harm neighbours when dispersing. In that case the
fecundities f•, fR and fD have no longer a simple expression and the conditionnal expression
must be taken into account by weighting correctly the effects of different actors. In order to
deal with such complication I define fc,p(zj) to be the average number of competing juve-
niles produced by a philopatric individual with average phenotype zj . Accordingly, fc,m(zj)
designates the average number of competing juveniles produced by a migrant and fc(zj) is
the average number of competing juveniles produced by a randomly sampled individual in
the population. It is important to realise that these definitions emphasis the counting of
the number of juveniles created and/or destroyed by the act of an actor with phenotype zj
which is not equivalent to the number of juveniles processed. For instance in the case of
altruism the net number of juveniles created by an altruistic act is B − C which takes into
account the cost to the actor and the benefit for the receptor. With these definitions, the
average fecundity of the residency deme of the FI can be written as
fR =
1
N
fc(z•) +
N − 1
N
(1−m) ((1−m) fc,p(z0) +mfc,m(z1))
+
N − 1
N
m
(
(1−m) fc,p(z1) + m
nd − 1 fc,m(z0) +m
nd − 2
nd − 1 fc,m(z1)
)
(2.40)
where fc(z•) = (1 −m) fc,p(z•) +mfc,p(z•) is the average number of competing juveniles
produced by the FI. With probability 1/N , the FI is an actor on the average fecundity of
its residency deme, with complementary probability different individuals are actors on the
residency deme’s fecundity. When altruism is expressed homogeneously fc,m = fc,p = fc =
B − C and (2.40) reduce to (2.17). The average number of competing juveniles produced
by adults in different demes reads:
fD = (1−m)
(
(1−m) fc,p(z1) + m
nd − 1 fc,m(z0) +m
nd − 2
nd − 1 fc,m(z1)
)
+ m (1−m)
(
1
nd− 1 fc,p(z0) +
nd − 2
nd − 1 fc,p(z1)
)
+ m2
(
nd − 2
(nd − 1)2 fc,m(z0) +
(
1− nd − 2
(nd − 1)2
)
fc,m(z1)
)
. (2.41)
The terms are obtained by sampling the FI and a different actor from two different demes.
For the first term, with probability (1 − m) the FI is a resident, the actor sampled in a
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different deme is either a resident or a migrant. In the latter case, with probability 1nd−1 the
migrant stem from the natal deme of the FI and with probability nd−2nd−1 the migrant stem
from a different population. The second term in (2.41) is obtained by noting that with prob-
abilitym (1−m) the FI is a migrant and the other actor is a resident. With probability 1nd−1
the resident is sampled in the natal deme of the FI and with complementary probability he
is sampled from a different deme. Finally, the third term in (2.41) is obtained by noting
that with probability m2 the FI is a migrant and the other actor is also a migrant. There
remains (nd − 2) demes from which both individuals could originate and each of them can
come from (nd − 1) demes, hence both migrants come from the same deme with probability
nd−2
(nd−1)2 . Again, the calculation of identity coefficients follows a similar decomposition (ap-
pendix 2.2). Further, when altruism is expressed homogeneously fc,m = fc,p = fc = B − C
and (2.41) reduce to (2.18)
In the presence of a conditional behaviour the fitness function is no longer expressed as
a function of the phenotypes of adults but as a function of the phenotypes of juveniles
w(z•, z0, z1). In the island model of dispersal the selective measure in is obtained by can-
celling ∂w∂z1 from S =
∂w
∂z•
+ ∂w∂z0 Q0 +
∂w
∂z1
Q1. After rearrangements this yields Hamilton’s
rule
S ∝ ∂w
∂z•
+
∂w
∂z0
R0, (2.42)
where R0 = Q0−Q11−Q1 . Alternatively we could have canceled
∂w
∂z0
from S, then
S ∝ ∂w
∂z•
+
∂w
∂z1
R1, (2.43)
with R1 = Q1−Q01−Q0 . Note that R1 is negative when R0 is positive. Both conditions (2.42)
and (2.43) are equivalent. Depending on the trait under interest, the former or the latter
is more informative. When the trait under study is altruism, the effect of the more related
class on the fitness of the FI is usually considered. By the definition given above, altruism
evolves if ∂w∂z• < 0,
∂w
∂z0
> 0 and if condition (2.42) is satisfied. For this last condition to
hold it is also necessary that ∂w∂z• +
∂w
∂z0
> 0. Since the partial derivatives sum to one this
prerequisite implies that ∂w∂z1 < 0. Therefore, the behaviour is altruistic from the point of
view of the more related class and spiteful from the point of view of the less related class.
By contrast, when the trait under interest is spite, the effect of the less related class on
the fitness of the FI is usually considered. Then, spite evolves if ∂w∂z• < 0,
∂w
∂z1
< 0 and if
condition (2.43) is satisfied. For this last condition to hold it is also necessary that ∂w∂z1 <
∂w
∂z•
which implies ∂w∂z0 > 0. The behaviour is again altruistic from the point of view of the more
related class and spiteful from the point of view of the less related class which is exactly what
we obtained for the evolution of altruism. Whether the behaviour under study is spitefull
or altruistic, the indirect benefits always flow through the more related class. Therefore in
the island model of dispersal the behaviour is always altruistic from this point of view of
the more related class.
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All for altruism, altruism for all
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse and compare different models about the evolution
of altruism under the same framework. The main aim is to identify which mechanisms are
able to sustain high levels of altruism. Further, conditions for the evolution of spite will be
given since it can be analysed without changing the formalisation.
Overlapping generations
The island model
A first mechanism proposed to disentangle the social from the competitive neighbourhood is
the survival of adult individuals (Taylor and Irwin, 2000). Since adults keep their breeding
spots and only juveniles compete, genetic identity during social interactions is expected to
be higher as genetic identity during competitive interactions. This section rewrites Taylor
and Irwin’s (2000) model of weak altruism with overlapping generations with the present
formalisation under strong altruism. Only effect of altruism on the fecundity will be con-
sidered here since effects on survival are less likely to sustain altruism (Taylor and Irwin,
2000). Events of the life cycle occur in the following order. (1) Altruistic donations occur
among adults in patches of size N . An altruistic act involves a cost C and a benefit B. (2)
Breeding occurs, each adult produces a large number of juveniles. After breeding, adults
survive to the next season with probability s and keep their breeding spot. (3) A fraction
m of juveniles disperse randomly to another deme. (4) Among all juveniles competing on a
local patch, (1− s)N individuals access to adulthood where (1− s) is the fraction of empty
sites in a patch. The fitness function for this life-cycle reads
w = s+ (1− s) f•
 (1−m)
(1−m) fR +mfD +
m
(1−m) fD +m
(
1
nd−1 fR +
nd−2
nd−1 fD
) .

(2.44)
Comparing this model with (2.15) shows that survival decreases the number of available
breeding spots. However this will have the consequence of increasing genetic identity among
adults and disentangle the social from the competive neigbborhood. The fecundity of the
focal individual is given by (2.21), the number of competing juveniles produced by the
residency deme of the FI is (2.22) and the number of juveniles produced by different demes
is (2.23). Substituting (2.21), (2.22) and (2.23) into (2.44) which is plugged into (2.19)
to get the selection measure. Cancelling S, rearranging in order to find a condition for
the evolution of altruism of the form r B − C > 0 (2.9), the relatedness with the social
neighborhood increases with an increase in s. It is also dependent on the number of demes
as well as on the migration rate fig.(2.1). The relatedness with the social neighbourhood r
increases with the number of demes and with an increase in philopatry. All things else being
equal it reaches its highest value in the infinite island limit nd→∞
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r =
2 s (1−m)
2 s (1−m) +N (2−m (1− s)) (2.45)
An upper bound for relatedness is found when m → 0, then r = sN+s . If individuals are
annual s = 0 the relatedness with the social neighborhood cancels. However non-dispersing
surviving adults increases the mean genetic identity on the patch fostering the evolution of
altruism. Note that the condition for altruism is that adults keep their breeding spot and
do not disperse. Thus altruism relies here on the conditional expression of a behaviour.
Disperse when juvenile and not when adult. Were adults allowed to dispers this would
cancel altruism. Finally, had we plugged (2.16), i.e. weak altruism with (2.22) and (2.23)
into (2.44) then we recover equ.(7) of Irwin and Taylor (2000).
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Figure 2.1: Relatedness with the social neighborhood r in the finite island model with
overlapping generations plotted as a function of the number of demes nd and the level of
philopatry (1−m) with N = 5 and s = 0.8.
The lattice model
Extension to the lattice model with overlapping generations is straightforward from (2.27).
I further assume that altruistic donations occur only within demes, the fitness function then
reads
w = s+ (1− s)
nd−1∑
i=0
mi
1 +B zD0 − C z•∑nd−1
j=0 mi−j (1 + (B − C) zRj )
, (2.46)
The selection measure is
S = (1− s)
BQD0 − (B − C)∑
i
∑
j
mimj Q
R
j

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∝ BQD0 − (B − C)
(
QD0
1− s2
(1− s)2γ −
2 s
(1− s)√γ
∑
l
mlQ
R
l
)
∝ BQD0 − (B − C)
(
QD0
1− s2
(1− s)2 γ −
2 s
(1− s)√γ
(∑
l
mlQ
D
l +
m0(1−QD0 )
N
))
∝ BQD0 − (B − C)
(
QD0
1− s2
(1− s)2 γ −
2 s
(1− s)√γ
(
Dd(1−QD0 ) +QD0 )
))
. (2.47)
The second equality is obtained by using (4.11) from appendix (2.1), the third equality
is obtained by expanding the identity among adults into identity among juveniles and the
fourth equality is obtained by using
Dd =
m0
N
−
∑
l
ml
QD0 −QDl
1−QD0
, (2.48)
where the second term is a measure of the average differentiation between demes and depends
on the shape of the dispersal distribution. The function Dd can be calculated by noting that
it can be expressed as the inverse Fourier transform at distance zero of ψ(z)−F (z) (1−ψ(z))N
((Gandon and Rousset, 1999), see appendix (2.1)). Inserting (2.47) into (2.2), taking the
infinite island limit (nd → ∞) one obtains S = −(1 − s)C + 2 s (B − C)Dd. Rearranging
this equation in order to obtain the relatedness with the social neighborhood
r =
2 sDd
1− s+ 2 sDd , (2.49)
which is an increasing function in Dd. It is not directly clear from (2.48) whether isolation by
distance increases or decreases the average differentiation between demes since the dispersal
distribution has an effect on all genetic identities including the identity between different
adults from the same deme. In order to study the effect of isolation by distance on the
relatedness with the social neighbourhood and hence on altruism it is useful to consider that
the dispersal distribution is geometric for those individuals dispersing. Note that Irwin and
Taylor (2001) already considered a stepping-stone model with overlapping-generation and
a single individual per deme, they concluded that the spatial structure has no qualitative
effects on altruism. This result will be corroborated below. Under a geometric distribution
of dispersal, a fraction 1 −m of individuals stays philopatric, the remaining individual are
splitted into those individuals moving clockwise and those moving counterclokwise. Each
fraction m/2 of migrants then follows a geometric distribution at distance j
g(j) = q (1− q)j−1 . (2.50)
This distribution encompass the whole range from the none-viscous island model of dispersal
to the extreme clumping of the stepping-stone model of dispersal. The parameter q is a
measure of population viscosity fig.(2.2). The stepping-stone model of dispersal is recovered
when q → 1, this implies that the probability of dispersing to a patch at distance 1 from
the natal deme becomes m1 → m while mj → 0 for all j > 1, i.e, migration is only possible
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to the nearest neighbour. On the contrary when q → 0 the probabilities of dipersal at any
distance equalize and we recover the none viscous infinite island model. The relatedness with
the social neighbourhood r (2.49) can be calculated explicitely but remains cumbersome,
appendix (2.1) . As can be seen from fig.(2.3) there is nearly no effect of population viscosity
on r, this appear unchanged for different values of survival. A similar result is obtained for
different values of migration. A conclusion is that population viscosity has nearly no effect
on altruism but rather inhibits its evolution (numerical observation).
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Figure 2.2: Density of the dispersal distribution as a function of distance for two different
levels of population viscosity. The steep curve is for high population viscosity, q = 0.9. The
other curve is for low viscosity, q = 0.1. The island model of dispersal would be a flat curve,
q = 0.
Sociality before dispersal
The island model
The evolution of altruism in the presence of overlapping-generation do not rely on any
accurate recognition system. Nonetheless, altruism relies on the conditionnal expression of
a behaviour which occur in overlapping-generation in the form of none-dispersing adults.
Another mechanism similar in its simplicity is the expression of altruism right before the
dispersal of juveniles (Taylor and Irwin, 2000). Under this scenario the fecundity benefits
will be higher than in the homogeneous case, eventually overcoming the negative effect of
the increase of kin competition. The events of the life cycle when altruism is expressed
before dispersal occur in the following order. (1) Breeding occurs, each adult produces a
large number of juveniles and dies. (2) Altruistic donations take place among juveniles. An
altruistic act involves a cost C (i.e., it results in the donor having C fewer juveniles) and
a benefit B (i.e., it results in the receptor having B more juveniles). Interactions takes
place among a large number of juveniles, say infinite (3) A fraction m of juveniles disperse
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Figure 2.3: Relatedness with the social neighborhood r as a function of population viscosity
q for various survival rates. The top curve is for s = 0.9, then s = 0.5 and and s = 0.1.
Viscosity has a negligible effect on relatedness but rather inhibits altruism (can be seen
numericaly).
randomly to another deme. (4) Among all juveniles competing for breeding spots on a patch,
N individuals access to adulthood. The fitness function for this life-cycle is given by (2.15),
it only remains to calculate the appropriate fecundities. The fecundity of the FI once it
settled in a deme is given by
f• = 1 +B z0 − C z•. (2.51)
The FI pays the cost of it’s altruistic act and his helped by the juveniles of it’s natal so that
z0 (i.e, the average phenotype of juveniles before dispersal excluding the FI) includes it’s
siblings as well as more distant relatives. The effect of altruism on fecundity is higher relative
to the case when altruism is expressed after dispersal (i.e, 2.21). What about the effect on
competition? The number of competing juveniles produced by adults after dispersal in the
residency deme of the FI depends on the intensity of social interactions before dispersal
fR = 1 +
1
N
(B z0 − C z•) + N − 1
N
(B − C) zD0 . (2.52)
A fraction 1/N of juveniles are produced by the FI, the remaining fraction 1 − 1/N of
juveniles are produced by different individuals. Since altruism occurred among a large
number of juveniles, in practice infinite, the offsprings created by the altruistic act of the FI
represent a negligible fraction of the overall number of competing juveniles (by contrast see
(2.22) where the help of the FI to different individuals is of order 1/(N −1)). Therefore, the
effect of altruism on kin competition is reduced relative to the homogeneous model. Finally,
the number of competing juveniles produced by different demes is
fD = 1 + (B − C) zR1 , (2.53)
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which is equivalent to (2.23). We now analyse this model in the infinite island limit (nd →
∞), the selection measure to use is then given by
S =
∂w
∂z•
+
∂w
∂z0
Q0 +
∂w
∂zD0
QD0 (2.54)
Using the equilibrium identities (appendix 3) and rearranging in order to find a condition
for the evolution of altruism of the form r B − C > 0, the relatedness with the social
neighborhood finally reads
r =
1
N
+ (1−m)2 N − 1
N2
. (2.55)
The relatedness with the social neighbourhood is a bit higher than in the situation of weak
altruism (2.14). This occurs because the effect of the FI on kin competition is lower when
altruism is expressed before dispersal because it is unlikely that competing juveniles have
been produced with the help of the FI. Note that when the fecundity is low, this is no longer
true and the FI becomes an actor on the benefits of partners producing competing juveniles.
The lattice model
The model investigated in the preceding section can be directly extended to the lattice
setting. The fitness function then reads
w =
nd−1∑
i=0
mi
f•∑nd−1
j=0 mi−j fj
, (2.56)
where fj is the average fecundity of individuals located at distance j of the residency deme
of the FI. As in the preceding section the fecundity of the FI is f• = 1 + B z0 − C z•, then
fj = 1+(B − C) zRj except f0 = 1+ 1N (B z0 − C z•)+ N−1N (B − C) zD0 which is the average
fecundity of the residency deme of the FI. Taking the selection measure (2.3) which reads
after some rearrangements
S = BQD0 − (B − C)
∑
i
∑
j
mimj Q
D
j −
∑
i
m2i
1
N
(
B(Q0 −QD0 ) + C (1−QD0 )
)
= B
((
1−QD0
)
γ
N
− Q
D
0 (1− γ) (1 + γ)
γ
−
((
1−QD0
)
γ
(
1
N2
− 1
N
)
−
(
1− γ
n
))
τ
)
− C
(
1−QD0
γ
− 1− γ
γ
)
. (2.57)
Where τ =
∑
im
2
i is the square of the dispersal probabilities over all distances. The second
equality is obtained by using (4.10), Q0 = γ
(
1
N +
N−1
N Q
D
0
)
, factorising B and C and
rearranging in order to obtain terms weighted by 1− γ and 1−QD0 . Taking the probability
of fixation (2.2), using 1−Q
D
0
1−γ = N nd and rearranging in order to produce the relatedness
with the social neighbourhood
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r =
nd − 2
ndN − 1 + τ
(1 + nd (N − 1))
N (ndN − 1) . (2.58)
when there is an infinite number of demes this reduce to
r =
1
N
+ τ
N − 1
N2
. (2.59)
The relatedness with the social neighbourhood increases with τ which is a measure of the
spread of the dispersal distribution. Assuming that individuals disperse out of their deme
with probability m as in the preceding section and then dispersal follows the distribution
g(j) according to distance j we can write
τ = (1−m)2 + m
2
2
∑
j
g(j)2. (2.60)
The factor 1/2 accounts for the fact that individuals move either clockwise or counter-
clockwise. It is a well-known result that the distribution which minimises the sum of squares
is uniform, this is the island pattern of migration. Dispersal distributions generating iso-
lation by distance thus increase τ relative to random dispersal. Qualitatively this is the
opposit result as the one obtained in the preceding section. The relatedness with the social
neighbourhood r is graphed in fig.(2.4) when dispersal follows a geometric distribution, then
τ = (1−m)2 + m2 q2 (2−q) which is a convexe function of migration when viscosity is high (q
near one). Then, the relatedness with the social neighbourhood takes its lowest value at
intermediate values of migration. The parameter τ increases with population viscosity and
reaches its maximum value when q → 1. Alternatively when q → 0, (2.59) reduce to (2.55).
A conclusion is that population viscosity rather favours altruism when altruistic donation
occur before dispersal and the migration rate is high. Under strong philopatry, altruism is
insensitive to viscosity.
Environmental stochasticity
Here I develop a model of altruism when demes get extinct by environmental stochasticity.
I follow the classical extinction-recolonisation models which can be directly integrated into
the probability of fixation framework (Roze and Rousset (2003), in press). Events of the
life cycle occur in the following order. (1) Social interactions involving altruistic donations
occur among adults in demes of size N . An altruistic act involves a cost C for the actor and
a benefit B for the receptor. (2) Demes get extinct with probability e due to environmental
disturbances. (3) Breeding occurs in non-extinct demes, each adult produces a large number
of juveniles and dies. A fraction m of juveniles disperse randomly to another deme. (4)
Among all juveniles competing in non-extinct patches, N individuals access to adulthood.
Different scenarios of recolonisation will be considered for extinct demes, nevertheless each
of these result in N individuals accessing to adulthood. The fitness function reads
w = (1− e) f•
(
(1−m)
(1−m) fR +mfD +
m
fD
+
e
(1− e) fD
)
. (2.61)
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Figure 2.4: Relatedness with the social neighborhood r as a function of population viscosity
q for various migration rates. The top curve is for m = 0.1, then m = 0.5 and and m = 0.9.
Viscosity has a negligible effect on relatedness but rather inhibits altruism (can be seen
numericaly).
The first and second terms in the parentheses are the expected number of adult offspring
in none-extinct demes whereas the third term is the expected number of adult offspring
in extinct demes. The fecundity of the focal individual is given by (2.21), the number of
competing juveniles produced by the residency deme of the FI is (2.22) and the number of
juveniles produced by different demes is (2.23). Substituting (2.21), (2.22) and (2.23) into
(2.62), taking the measure of selection which reads
S = BQD0 − C − (B − C) (1− e) (1−m)2QR0 , (2.62)
where
QD0 = γ
(
(1− e) (1−m)2QR0 + eQD0,e
)
, (2.63)
is the average identity between two different adults. When two individuals are sampled
without replacement from a none-extinct deme their identity reduce to the classical setting
((4.21) with no survival in the infinite island limit). The identity between different adults
in an extinct deme is designated by QD0,e. Cancelling (2.62), the relatedness with the social
neighbourhood can be written
r =
eQD0,e
1− (1− e) (1−m)2QR0
. (2.64)
Were the identity between adults zero in recolonised deme, altruism would not evolve. The
reduction in kin competition due to deme extinction is not translated into a benefit because
the average level of altruism decreases concomitantly. In other words, the social neighbour-
hood matches the competitive neighbourhood. This would occur for instance if individuals
disperse randomly and directly recolonise extinct patches (maybe the most likely biological
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scenario?) in the migrant pool mode. By contrast, when individuals share some genetic
identiy within recolonised patches altruism should evolve. Population extinction reduces
kin competition locally but recolonisation by similar individuals means that the altruistic
trait is successfully exported.
Different models of recolonisation have been proposed. For review see Rousset (2003b). It
is usually assumed that dispersal occurs first (migrants falling in empty patches are unsuc-
cesful) and recolonisation occur in a second round of dispersal. In fact recolonisation could
precede dispersal which would then occur in a second round (migrants falling in recolonised
patches are then treated as unsuccesful). Both scenario will be considered. I further assume
that demes are directly recolonised by N individuals in the propagule mode (recoloniser
stem from the same deme) which is likely to generate identity between individuals. The
identity between adults is written QD0,e = φ
(
1
N +
N−1
N Q
D
0
)
where φ is the probability that
both individuals stem from the same patch. The relatedness with the social neighbourhood
then runs
r =
e φ
e (n (1− φ) + φ) + (1− e) n (1− (1−m)2) . (2.65)
For the migrant pool model φ = 0. For the propagule pool model when recolonisation pre-
cedes dispersal φ = 1. Finally, if dispersal precedes recolonisation in the propagule pool mode
φ = (1−m)2. In the latter case r = e
e+((1−m)−2−1)n and r → 1 if m → 0. A conclusion is
that altruism can be strongly favoured under a population extinction-recolonisation process
when the identity between recolonisers is high. Altruistic individuals are then non-randomly
associated during recolonisation and this allow the successful exportation of the benefits of
altruism. In practice, propagule dispersal certainly relay on a recognition mechanisms so it
is not a simple mechanism to sustain altruism. And we now turn to kin recognition.
Kin recognition through spatial recognition
In the two models analysed so far (overlapping-generations and altruism before dispersal)
altruism was directed more toward close kin because of specific assumptions about the
life-cycle. Another way to achieve higher genetic identity in social interaction than in com-
petitive interactions is to express altruism conditionnaly. Kin recognition allows actors to
discriminate between two classes of individuals and to interact preferentially with the more
related class (Komdeur and Hatchwell, 1999). In the next two sections I investigate the
evolution of altruism in the presence of spatial recognition following the analysis of Perrin
and Lehmann (2001). Further, the evolution of a damaging behaviour will also be exlpored.
Helping neighbours
Here, altruism is expressed conditionaly on the type of residency deme where individuals
reach adulthood. Events of the life cycle occur in the following order. (1) Altruistic donations
occur among adults in patches of size N . Individuals remaining in their natal nest express
the altruistic behaviour with probability Ep whereas immigrants express altruism with a
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lower probability Em. An altruistic act involves a cost C and a benefit B. (2) Breeding
occurs, each adult produces a large number of juveniles. After breeding, adults survive to the
next season with probability s and keep their breeding spot. (3) A fraction m of juveniles
disperse randomly to another deme. Among all juveniles competing on a local patch, N
individuals access to adulthood where. The fitness function for this life-cycle is still given
by (2.15). In this setting, the fecundity of the FI reads
f• = 1 + (1−m) ((1−m)EpB z0 +mEmB z1 − Ep C z•)
+ m
(
(1−m)EpB z1 + m
nd − 1 EmB z0 +m
nd − 2
nd − 1 EmB z1 − Em C z•
)
.(2.66)
The second term in this equation counts the effects of actors on the FI’s fecundity when it is
philopatric, while the third term counts the effects of actors when the FI disperses. Now it
remains to consider the competitive neighborhood. First, the number of competing juveniles
produced by a resident individual is
fc,p (zj) = 1 + Ep (B − C) zj (2.67)
Second, the number of competing juveniles produced by a migrant individual is
fc,m (zj) = 1 + Em (B − C) zj (2.68)
Finally, the average number of juveniles produced by an individual is
fc (zj) = 1 + (B − C) ((1−m)Ep +mEm) zj (2.69)
Substituting (2.67), (2.68), and (2.69) into (2.40) and (2.41), the last two equations are then
plugged with (2.66) into (2.15) which reads as the fitness function. The selection measure
to use now is given by (2.42) and the relatedness measure is calculated with the identities
from appendix (2.2). Canceling S and rearranging in order to obtain a condition in the form
r B − C > 0, the relatedness with the social neighbourhood reads
r = (Ep − Em) x(m,nd, Em, Ep) (2.70)
where x(m,nd, Em, Ep) is a complexe function of the parameter of the model. The related-
ness with the social neighbourhood is positive only if Ep > Em and is ploted in fig.(2.5) as
a function of the migration rate and the number of demes in the population. It reaches its
highest value under perfect discrimination Ep = 1 and Em = 0 in the infinite island limit
nd →∞ at some intermediate value of m, then r ' 13N . Under a dispersal rate of m = nd−1nd ,
the population behaves like a panmictic one, individuals sampled in the same deme have the
same genetic identity as individuals sampled from different demes, then r = −1N nd−1 and we
recover (2.25) independently of the values of Ep and Em.
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Figure 2.5: Relatedness with the social neighborhood r in the finite island model when
altruism is expressed only by philopatric individuals (Ep = 1 and Em = 0) plotted as a
function of the number of demes nd and the level of philopatry (1 −m), with N = 5. The
relatedness increases as the number of demes increase and is a concave function of philopatry.
Damaging neighbours
Is it a good strategy to express a damaging behaviour only when dispersing? This question
can be tackled with the previous model simply by assuming that the damaging behaviour
is expressed preferentially by migrants Em > Ep and substituting B = −D. Then, hurting
another individual involves a cost C (i.e., it results in the donor having C fewer offspring)
and a damage D (i.e., it results in the recipient having D fewer offspring). The condition
for the evolution of the behaviour must now satisfy −r D−C > 0. The relatedness with the
social neighborhood must be negative for the behaviour to evolve. The dependence of −r on
the number of demes and the migration rate is given in fig.(2.6). Comparing fig.(2.6) with
fig.(2.5) shows that all things else being equal the selective pressure on damaging is higher
than the selective pressure on altruism when recognition is spatial. This occur because the
FI has a direct benefit of harming patch neighbours and this reduces the intensity of com-
petition faced by its offspring.
Is damaging neighbours spiteful? Remind that the FI interacts with two classes of indi-
viduals, those from its natal deme and those born in different demes. Since the damaging
behaviour is expressed only by migrants, the behaviour is preferentially directed towards the
less related class from the point of view of the FI. If the decrease in competition increases
the opportunity of the more related class to get more offsprings to adulthood, then, the
behaviour can even be at a fitness cost for the FI since the party which gets the benefits
of spite is the more related class. As emphasised in section (3.3), the direction of selection
on the damaging behaviour is given equivalently by (2.42) and by (2.43). To classify the
behaviour as spiteful we take the point of view of the less related class, we consider (2.34).
Spite occurs when both the effect of the FI and the effect of the less related class on the
fitness of the FI are negative, i.e, ∂w∂z• < 0 and
∂w
∂z1
< 0. When this situation occurs ∂w∂z0 > 0
by necessity and we can see that the effect of the more related class is altrusitic which is
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the benefit of spite. The ratio ∂w∂z• /
∂w
∂z1
and the selective pressure −r D − C are plotted in
fig.(2.7), fig.(2.8) and fig.(2.9). The sign of the ratio informs us whether the behaviour is
spiteful or selfish and the sign of the selective pressure informs us if the damaging behaviour
is favored by selection or not. If the number of demes is very low the effect of the less related
class on the fitness of the FI is deleterious as long as migration is limited. In this situation
the negative effect is counterbalanced by the reduction of competition due to the reduction
in competition caused by the more related class. When philopatry increases the behaviour
becomes essentially selfish because the effect of the FI on itself becomes a benefit, fig.(2.9).
The width of spite is very narrow as can also be seen from fig.(2.7) and fig.(2.8) because
there is no active discrimination and FI is likely to be injured by its close relatives. When
the number of demes increases the behaviour becomes increasingly selfish but is still selected
for. In the infinite island limit, the effect of the FI on its expected number of offsprings is
∂w
∂z•
= −Cm+ (C +D) m (1−m)
2
N
, (2.71)
and the effect of the individuals from the natal deme of the FI on its fitness reads
∂w
∂z0
= 0, (2.72)
since only migrants express the behaviour. In the infinite island limit the relatdness with
the social neighborhood is r = − (1−m)2
N−(1−m)2 and is obtained by cancelling (2.71).
5
10
15
nd
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Philopatry (1-m)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3-r
Figure 2.6: Minus the relatedness with the social neighborhood r plotted as a function of
the number of demes nd and the level of philopatry (1 − m) in the finite island model of
dispersal when altruism is expressed only by migrant individuals (Ep = 0 and Em = 1) ,
with N = 5.
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Figure 2.7: Sign of the total selective pressure −r D−C, of the effect of the FI on its fitness
∂w
∂z•
and of the effect of the less related class on the FI’s fitness ∂w∂z1 as a function of the
population size N . The other variables take the values D = 0.5, C = 0.08, m = 0.2 and
nd = 5. The signs of the selective pressures allow to classify the behaviour as spiteful or
selfish.
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Figure 2.8: Sign of −r D − C, of the effect of the FI on its fitness ∂w∂z• and of the effect of
the less related class on the FI’s fitness ∂w∂z1 as a function of the intensity of the damage D.
The other variables take the values N = 5, C = 0.08, m = 0.2 and nd = 20.
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Figure 2.9: Sign of the total selective pressure −r D−C, of the effect of the FI on its fitness
∂w
∂z•
and of the effect of the less related class on the FI’s fitness ∂w∂z1 as a function of the level
of philopatry (1 −m). The other variables take the values D = 0.5, C = 0.08, N = 5 and
nd = 2
Kin recognition through phenotype matching
A more refined mechanism of kin recognition is phenotype-matching with individuals ac-
tively estimating their genetic similarity by scanning a sample of phenotypic traits in other
individuals. Since common genealogy generates phenotypic similarity for genetically deter-
mined traits, each locus can be used as an independent sample to derive an estimate of
average genetic identity (Frank 1998). Interactions thus occur pairwise and the payoff of the
FI when interacting with a class j member will be designated by F•,j . This payoff depends
on the reciprocal acceptance of the partners so that Ai,j will stand for the probability that
an individual of class i accepts an individual of class j. Different outcome are possible de-
pending on acceptance and rejection of the partner and vice versa. In all, depending on the
actions of individuals there are four possible outcomes and I use the notations of the prison-
ner’s dilemma to highligt the link to this type of approach: R(z•, zj) designates the reward,
S(z•, zj) the sucker’s payoff, T (z•, zj) the temptation to defect and P (z•, zj) the punishment
(Killingback and Doebeli 2002). Note that the different outcomes might be functions of the
investment of the focal actor z• and its partner of class zj so that this formalisation is not
limited to the setting of the Prisonner’s dilemma. With these definitions, the payoff of the
FI becomes
F•,j = A•, j (Aj,•R+ (1−Aj,•) S) + (1−A•,j) (Aj,• T + (1−Aj,•) P ) , (2.73)
We can replace the outcomes by the costs and benefits for altruism, then R ≡ B(zj)−C(z•),
S ≡ −C(z•), T ≡ B(zj) and P ≡ 0. After rearrangements (2.73) fuses down to
F•,j = Aj,•B (zj)−A•,j C (z•). (2.74)
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It is interesting to see that three different types of models of altruism can be investigated
with this equation. (1) Dropping the dependence of cost and benefits on the variable z such
that they become parameters and considering the Ai,j ≡ Ai as the probabilities that a class
i member plays altruist we recover the setting of the classical Prisonner’s Dilemma (Frank,
1995). (2) Setting all the Ai,j = 1 and considering the cost and benefits as functions of z we
recover the type of payoffs investigated so far, this has been called the continuous Prisonner’s
Dilemma recently (Killingback and Doebeli, 2002). In fact, with the first approach we ask
the question of what is the probability of playing ”altruist” while with the second approach
we ask the question of how match to invest into altruism. These are the two faces of a same
coin. It seems that kin selection theory investigates the continuous Prisonner’s Dilemma
since its beginning wherease the iterated continuous Prisonner’s Dilemma has only lately
come to the attention of researcher workers (Sherratt and Roberts, 1999; Wahl and Nowak,
1999; Killingback and Doebeli, 2002). (3) The third type on models which can be treated
with the payoff function (2.67) is to consider the Ai,j as acceptance probabilities which
jointly coevolve with investment into altruism as done by Lehmann and Perrin (2002).
Helping residents
Let us now return to altruism through phenotype matching. I will treat the Ai,j of (2.74) as
acceptance probabilities so that expression of altruism becomes conditional on the class of
the receptor. This is the setting of Lehmann and Perrin (2002), but the Ai,j ’s will be held
fixed here so that selection only on altruism will be considered. The life-cycle runs as follow.
(1) Altruistic donations occur among adults. With probability Ad an actor engages in an
altruistic donation with and individual born in its natal deme (desirable individual). Since
the total population is finite, an immigrant might also interact with a relative stemming from
its natal patch (a desirable individual). With probability Au errors occur and an individual
born in a different deme than the actor receive an altruistic donation. (2) Breeding occurs,
each adult produces a large number of juveniles. (3) A fraction m of juveniles disperse
randomly to another deme. Among all juveniles competing on a local patch, N individuals
access to adulthood. The fitness function for this life-cycle is again given by (2.15). Let us
denote F•,d = Ad (B z0 − C z•) and F•,u = Au (B z1 − C z•) as the payoffs of the FI when
interacting with the desirable class (individuals stemming from the natal population of the
FI) and the undesirable class (individuals born in different demes than the FI) respectively.
Taking into account all types of interactions, the fecundity of the FI reads
f• = 1 + (1−m) ((1−m)F•,d +mF•,u)
+ m
(
(1−m)F•,u + m
nd − 1 F•,d +m
nd − 2
nd − 1 F•,u
)
. (2.75)
The number of competing juveniles produced by a resident depends on the probability of
expressing the altruistic trait. An inspection of the second term on the right of (2.72) reveals
that the number of competing juveniles produced by a resident is
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fc,p (zj) = 1 + (B − C) ((1−m)Ad +mAu) zj . (2.76)
From the third term of (2.72), the number of competing juveniles produced by a migrant is
fc,m (zj) = 1 + (B − C)
(
(1−m)Au + m
nd − 1 Ad +m
nd − 2
nd − 1 Au
)
zj . (2.77)
Finally, the average number of juveniles produced by an individual is obtained by substitut-
ing the last two equation into
fc (zj) = (1−m) fc,p (zj) +mfc,m (zj). (2.78)
Substituting (2.76), (2.77), and (2.78) into (2.40) and (2.41), the last two equations are then
plugged with (2.75) into (2.15) which reads as the fitness function. The selection measure
is given by (2.42). Canceling S and rearranging in order to obtain a condition in the form
(2.9), the relatedness with the social neighborhood runs
r = (Ad − Au) y(m,nd, Ad, Au), (2.79)
where y(m,nd, Ad, Au) is a complexe function of the parameter of the model. The relatedness
with the social neighbourhood is positive only if Ad > Au. This relatedness is dependent on
the number of demes as well as on the migration rate fig.(2.10). All things else being equal,
it reaches its highest value under perfect discrimination Ad = 1 and Au = 0 in the infinite
island limit nd→∞ at some intermediate value of m, then r → 1N .
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Figure 2.10: Relatedness with the social neighborhood r in the finite island model when
altruism is expressed conditionaly on the status of the partner plotted as a function of the
number of demes nd and the level of philopatry (1−m), with N = 5. Altruism occurs only
with the most related class, i.e. individuals born in the same deme as the FI, Ad = 0.95 and
Au = 0.05.
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Damaging immigrants
Is it a good strategy to harm migrants when individuals are able to behave conditionaly?
The response is yes and the condition for the evolution of a damaging behaviour is given
by −r D − C > 0. The condition is fulfilled if the relatedness with the social neighbor-
hood r becomes negative and this occur only if Au > Ad which is preferential interaction
with immigrants. The dependence of the relatedness with the social neighbourhood on the
number of demes and the migration rate is given in fig.(2.11). Under perfect disassortative
interactions where individuals only harm migrants and never make the mistake to injure
a relative the relatedness can have very low values for high levels of philopatry. A maybe
surprising result. In order to get some idea about the selective pressure on damaging it is
usefull to assume perfect recognition (Ad = 0 and Au = 1) in the infinite island limit when
( nd→∞). Then, the effect of the FI on its expected number of offspring is
∂w
∂z•
= − (1− (1−m)2) C + (1− (1−m)2) (1−m)2 (C +D)
N
. (2.80)
Where (1 − (1 − m)2) = (1 − m)m + m is the probability that the FI interacts with an
undesirable individual and express the deleterious act. This occur with probability m if it
remains philopatric and with probability one if it disperses. The FI pays the cost of its
own behaviour which is given by the first term in (2.80). However, the FI also reduces the
competition its offsprings will experience according to the number of juveniles destroyed
by the deleterious act. The gain of damaging migrants increases the settling opportunities
of the fraction (1 −m) of the offsprings of the FI remaining philopatric. These offsprings
experience less competition only if the juveniles produced in the residency deme of the
FI remain philopatric, probability (1 −m), because the undesirable parents of this cohort
where harmed. Adding both components, explains the factor (1−m)2 in the second term of
(2.80). The effect of individuals born in thethe natal deme of the FI on its expected number
of offsprings is
∂w
∂z0
= m (1−m)4 (C +D) N − 1
N
. (2.81)
Where m (1 −m)2 is the probability that both the FI and an individual born in the natal
deme of the FI remained philopatric times the probability that the latter has interacted with
an undesirable migrant and has expressed the deleterious act. As seen above, damaging has
a positive effect on the fitness of the FI only when its offspring remain philopatric in order
to compete with juveniles issued from the same cohort which occur at rate (1−m)2. When
harming neighbours the FI sacrifices its resources to increase the fitness of relatives by
reducing the productivity of the less related class. Dispersal has two opposing effects on
the selective pressures. On one side, when migration increases, there are more undesirable
individuals in the focal deme which boost the opportunity of displacing competing juveniles.
But the concomitant increase of dispersal of the juveniles of the FI reduces the benefit of
damaging. As can be seen from fig.(2.10) the benefits of harming migrants increase with
philopatry but vanish when there are no more migrants as can be seen from (2.80) and
34 Chapter 2. One shot interactions
(2.81). By contrast to the spatial recognition model, the effect on the fitness of the FI of
those individuals stemming from its natal deme does not vanish in the infinite island limit
and remains even pretty high.
Is damaging neighbour spiteful? The behaviour is spiteful if the effect of the FI on its fitness
is negative ∂w∂z• < 0 and the effect of the less related class on the FI is also negative
∂w
∂z1
< 0.
To see under what condition the damaging behviour qualifies as spite or selfish, the effects
of actors on the fitness of the FI ∂w∂z• and
∂w
∂z1
, and the selective pressure −r D − C on the
damaging trait are plotted as a function of the population size, the intensity of the damage
and the level of philopatry in fig.(2.12), fig.(2.13) and fig.(2.14) respectively.
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Figure 2.11: Minus the relatedness with the social neighborhood r in the finite island model
when altruism is expressed conditionaly on the status of the partner plotted as a function
of the number of demes nd and the level of philopatry (1 −m), with N = 5. Individuals
perfectly discriminate individuals stemming from their natal patch and harm other ones,
Ad = 0 and Au = 1.
Familiarity-based recognition and siblings
In this section I turn to a situation where social interaction occur among members of a
family, say among siblings. Competition occur at the level of the whole population which is
assumed finite. Individuals are able to discriminate between sibllings and non-siblings and
can thus interact preferentially with a specific class.
Damaging none-siblings
As usual, creatures are haploid and annual, events of the life cycle occur in the following
order. (1) Social interactions take place among adults. The FI interacts with siblings with
propability x and their phenotype is designated by zs. With complementary probability
(1− x), the FI interacts with the remaining individuals of the population whose phenotype
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Figure 2.12: Sign of the total selective pressure −r D − C, of the effect of the FI on its
fitness ∂w∂z• and of the effect of the less related class on the FI’s fitness
∂w
∂z1
as a function
of the population size N . The other variables take the values Ad = 0, Au = 1, D = 0.5,
C = 0.08, m = 0.2 and nd = ∞. The signs of the selective pressures allow to classify the
behaviour as spiteful or selfish.
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Figure 2.13: Sign of −r D − C, of the effect of the FI on its fitness ∂w∂z• and of the effect of
the less related class on the FI’s fitness ∂w∂z1 as a function of the intensity of the damage D.
The other variables take the values Ad = 0, Au = 1, N = 5, C = 0.08, m = 0.2 and nd =∞.
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Figure 2.14: Sign of the total selective pressure −r D − C, of the effect of the FI on its
fitness ∂w∂z• and of the effect of the less related class on the FI’s fitness
∂w
∂z1
as a function
of the level of philopatry (1 − m). The other variables take the values Ad = 0, Au = 1,
D = 0.5, C = 0.08, N = 5 and nd =∞.
is denoted by zns. Each type of interaction result in a damage of D units of reproductive
power for the receptor and a cost of C units of reproductive power for the actor. (2) Breeding
occurs, each adult produces a large number of juveniles and dies. (3) Among all juveniles
competing in the population, N individuals access to adulthood.
The variable x depend on the mechanism of recognition and can be subject to evolultion
but will be treated here as a parameter. Acceptance might occur as in the preceding section
or searching might evolve as in Lehmann and Perrin (2003), then x = χAsχAs+(1−χ)Ans where
χ is the frequency of siblings in the population and Aj is the acceptance of class j. Alterna-
tively, x might also be interpretated as the probability of non-mistaken interactions through
familiarity based recognition (Perrin and Lehmann 2001), then x is likely to lay close to one
and I take this option for the forthcoming. As usual, zR0 designates the mean phenotype of
the population. The mean number of competing junveniles produced in the population is
thus given by 1 −D zR0 − C zR0 because each spitfull act destroyes C units of reproductive
potential and damages D additionnal units. Collecting terms, the fitness function reads
w =
1− xD zs − (1− x) D zns − C z•
1−D zR0 − C zR0
. (2.82)
The average population phenotype can be splited into the phenotype of the FI and the
mean phenotype between different individuals which in turn can be splited again into
the phenotype of sibling and the mean phenotype between none siblings zR0 =
1
N z• +(
1− 1N
) (
1
N zs +
(
1− 1N
)
zns
)
. While the FI constitutes a fraction 1/N of the population
mean phenotype, siblings constitute a fraction 1/N of the mean phenotype between different
individuals. Note that if interactions were random we would have x = 1/N . The measure
of selection I use in this context emphasis that the class to which the behaviour is directed
are the none siblings, Hamilton’s rule then runs
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S ∝ ∂w
∂z•
+
∂w
∂zs
Rs, (2.83)
where the relatedness Rs = Qs−Qns1−Qns compares the genetic identity between siblings to the
identity of genes between non-siblings and is calculated in appendix (2.3). The effect of the
FI on it’s expected number of adult offsprings evaluated at (z• = zns = zs = 0) is
∂w
∂z•
= −C + D + C
N
(2.84)
By harming neighbors the focal individual reduces competition in the population. Its off-
springs experience more vacant breeding spot according to the probability 1/N that they
benefit from the FI own behavior. The effect of non-siblings on the expected number of
adult offsprings of the focal individual reads
∂w
∂zns
= −D (1− x) + (C +D) (N − 1)
2
N2
(2.85)
Under disassortative interactions and small population this selective pressure is likely to be
negative because the cost of direct injury exceeds the benefits of the reduction in competition.
By contrast the effects of siblings on the fitness of the FI is essentially a benefit since they
carefully avoid to interact with him
∂w
∂zs
= −Dx+ (C +D) (N − 1)
N2
. (2.86)
Canceling the selection measure (2.83) and rearranging the equation in order to find a
condition of the form −r D − C > 0, the relatedness with the social neighborhood reads:
r =
xN − 2
N − 1 . (2.87)
Under random interactions x = 1/N and we recover (2.25). When the FI perfectly avoids to
hurt its siblings x = 0 the relatedness with the social neighborhood reduce to r = −2N−1 . As
long as the population size remains small, the units of reproductive potential lost by injury
are compensated by the decrease in competition. However, the relatedness with the social
neighborhood rapidly tend to zero as population size increase because the effect of siblings
in reducing competition is diluted compared to the direct damaging of none-siblings. The
behaviour qualifies as spite if the sign of the effect of the FI on its fitness is negative ∂w∂z• < 0
and if the effect of the less related class on the FI is also negative ∂w∂zns < 0. The effect
of actors on the fitness of the FI ∂w∂z• and
∂w
∂zns
, and the selective pressure −r D − C on
the trait are plotted as a function of the population size and as a function of the intensity
of the damage in fig.(2.15) and fig.(2.16) respectively. In a population of small size, the
behaviour is selfish. As population size increases the behavior becomes spitfull because the
effect is deleterious for the FI. Above a threshold in fig.(2.15) the pressure on the damaging
behaviour vanishes. This is best understood by an inspection of equ.(2.86). In a population
of large size, the FI cannot ”feel” anymore the reduction in competition because the effect
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of siblings is diluted in the size of the population. As N →∞ we have ∂w∂zs → 0 when x = 0.
Harming is counterselected when the population becomes large.
Helping siblings
The relatedness with the social neighborhood can directly be used to predict the outcome
of selection on altruism when social interactions take place preferentially among siblings. It
is sufficient to replace D ≡ −B and from (2.87) we see that relatedness becomes positive
when x > 1/N . By contrast to spite, a large population size fosters altruism because kin
competition is reduced fig.(2.17). When individuals interact only with their siblings x = 1,
then (2.87) becomes r = N−2N−1 . This is maybe the simplest model of kin selection and is close
to Hamilton’s original model which assumes familly interactions in a panmictic population
of infinite size. This setting yields very high level of altruism and is recovered here when
N →∞.
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Figure 2.15: Sign of the total selective pressure −r D − C, of the effect of the FI on its
fitness ∂w∂z• and of the effect of individual born in different demes on the FI’s fitness
∂w
∂zns
as
a function of the population size N . The other variables take the values x = 0, D = 3 and
C = 0.5. The signs of the selective pressures allow to classify the behaviour as spiteful or
selfish.
Groups and green beards
We saw in section (2.3) that when groups are randomly formed, altruism cannot evolve.
However, assortative group formation sustain altruism (Hamilton 1975). In the next section
I focus on the evolution of spite when groups are formed disassortatively.
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Figure 2.16: Sign of the total selective pressure −r D − C, of the effect of the FI on its
fitness ∂w∂z• and of the effect of individual born in different demes on the FI’s fitness
∂w
∂zns
of the intensity of the damage D. The other variables take the values x = 0, N = 20 and
C = 0.05.
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Figure 2.17: Relatedness for spite and altruism as a function of population size N with
B = 0.5, D = 0.5 and C = 0.125. The upper curve describes the increase in relatedness (r)
when altruism occurs perfectly among siblings. If N → ∞ then r = 1 and the panmictic
model of altruism is recovered (Hamilton’s original model). The decelerating curve is minus
the relatedness −(−r) when spite occurs preferentially among none-siblings. If N →∞ then
relatedness vanish.
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Harming blue beards
As seen in the previous section, spite evolves only insofar damaging is directed towards the
less related class. Therefore, individuals harming others must interact with non-harming
individuals. This situation decreases the variance between groups of interacting individuals
fig.(4.4). The mechanism leading to such disassortative grouping is now assumed indepen-
dent of common genealogy, only the spiteful locus is concerned with negative correlation
during social interactions. Imagine the simple case of two genes, one causing a specific
phenotypic effect and another determining the level of spite and allowing its bearers to de-
termine whether or not other individuals possess specific phenotype expressed by the first
gene. Whether or not spite may evolve will depend on the linkage disequilibrium between
these two genes. This is the situation of a green-beard gene, an idea invented by Hamilton
and named by Dawkins. Here, interactions occur preferentially among dissimilar individu-
als, say blue beards. A similar mechanism promoting non-random association during social
interactions would be a linkage-disequilibrium between the spiteful locus and a grouping
tendency Avile´s (2002).
The life cycle when groups are formed temporary and disassortatively occur in the following
order. (1) Groups of size n are formed disassortatively. Thus, individuals tend to assort with
partners which are dissimilar. (2) Deleterious social interactions take place within groups.
A harmful act involves a cost C (i.e., it results in the donor having C fewer juveniles) and
a damage D (i.e., it results in the recipient having D fewer juveniles). The FI harms other
group members but he is injured according to the average phenotype zj in its group of type
j. I assume that the FI is excluded from mean phenotype of the group. (3) Breeding occurs,
each adult produces a large number of juveniles and dies, groups are dissolved. (4) Among
all juveniles competing in the population, N individuals access to adulthood. The fitness of
the FI when it interacts in a group with j other spiteful individuals reads
wj =
1−D zDj − C z•
1−D zR0 − C zR0
, (2.88)
where zR0 =
1
N z• +
N−1
N z
D
0 as usual. The selective measure to use is given by S ∝ ∂wj∂z• +
∂wj
∂zD
j
Rg with the relatedness measure Rg = a, see section (2.3). This relatedness is negative
under disassortative group formation since the genetic identity within groups is lower than
the average genetic identity in the population. The effect of the focal individual on it’s
expected number of adult offsprings is
∂wj
∂z•
= −C + D + C
N
, (2.89)
which is exactly similar to the selective pressure already encountered in the preceding model.
The effect of group interactors on the expected number of adult offspring of the focal indi-
vidual is essentialy a damage
∂wj
∂zDj
= −D. (2.90)
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This selective pressure is always negative and will be weighted by a negative relatedness
measure if interaction occur disassortatively. Finally, the effect of an average individual of
the population on the fitness of the FI reads
∂wj
∂zD0
= (D + C)
N − 1
N
. (2.91)
The direction of selection is obtained by canceling S or (4.37). Rearranging in order to get
the form −r D − C > 0, noting that N = nng (the product of group size and the number
of groups) the relatedness with the social neighborhood is explicitly given by
r =
nng a− 1
nng − 1 . (2.92)
The level a of assortative interaction can be related to group size by using the Polya dis-
tribution a = α−1n+α−1 where α ∈ [0,∞], appendix (3). Under random interactions α = 1
and we recover r = −1nng−1 which is similar to (2.25). When the number of groups is large
ng → ∞ and (2.92) reduce to r = α−1n+α−1 . Under perfect disassortative and dyadic interac-
tions, respectively α = 0 and n = 2, the relatedness to the social neighborhood takes it’s
minimal value r = −1. It becomes a fairly good idea to harm the partner and since r = −1
the FI is insured that its partners does not hide a machine gun.
Above a critical population size, the behaviour becomes spiteful as can be seen from (2.89)
and (2.90). Surprisingly, (2.92) predict spite even in a population of large size. By contrast if
we look at (2.87) the selective pressure vanish rapidly as the size of the population becomes
large. But the action of hurting none-sibs has a very different consequence on competition
than the action of hurting individuals without green-beards. Only the effect of siblings in
reducing the competition in the population translates into a benefit for the FI. Since the
proportion of siblings is a decreasing fraction of the population as its size increases, the effect
of decreasing competition is eroded as the size of the population increase. By contrast, for
assortative group formation, all individuals carrying the damaging allele reduce competition
since they pair with the none-carrier. This mass action largely increase the fitness of the
harmful allele. The effect is accentuated when recognition is good such that the variance be-
tween groups vanish. However, this effect is strong only when the damaging allele is frequent
in the population. But what happens if a single damaging allele appears in a population of
very large size, say infinite. Then, (2.92) would still predicts the evolution of spite, but it is
important to note that this equation do not capture fully the problem of the origination of
the spitful allele. This occurs because the parameter of assortative interaction a was assumed
independent of the frequency of the spiteful allele in the population. A consequence is that
the measure of selection itself becomes independent of gene frequency, (4.37) in appendix
(3). However, a single individual in a large population has no effect in reducing competition
and cannot be introduced into the population in the absence of drift if the behaviour is
costly. This problem can in fact be analysed be letting the ability of individuals to form
disassortative groups be dependent on the frequency of the spitful allele. For instance one
might assume that when the frequency of the spiteful allele A is low in the population it
is easy to find individuals with the opposite allele and harm them. By contrast when the
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allele is common it becomes increasingly difficult to pair with none-spiteful individuals so
that harmful individuals become increasingly harmed. This analyses has been carried out in
appendix (3.3) and shows that the overall evolutionary balance (2.1) for a damaging allele
is still positive in a population of very large size, even infinite. Therefore, the conclusions
drawn from (2.92) hold qualitatively. More generally their will be an interplay between
linkage-disequilibrium and selection at two locus for the advance of a green-beard gene in a
population. This multilocus game theory is far beyond the present topic.
Helping green beards
As usual we can find the condition for the evolution of altruism by substituting the damage
D ≡ −B for a benefit and look under which conditions the relatedness with the social
neighborhoods becomes positive in (2.92). This occur when a > 0, because interactions
then occur assortatively. Individuals which are alike are likely to interact together. Fairly
high relatedness can be achieved even in large groups if the discrimination mechanism is fine
tuned. Recently, different mechanisms have been proposed to achieve a correlation at the
altruistic locus during social interactions, such as the grouping model of Avile´s (2002), the
environmental feedback of Pepper and Smuts (2002) and tag-based models of Riolo et al.
(2001), the latter being in fact green-beards.
Summary
As emphasised by Queller (1992), individuals must be more related in social than in com-
petitive interactions for altruism to evolve. The mechanisms investigated here which allow
to disentangle both of these neighbourhoods are in one way or another all forms of condi-
tionnal behaviour. For instance, when altruism is expressed before dispersal it is directed
solely towards close kin and overlapping-generations assumes non-dispersing adults. Let us
summaries what has been done in this chapter with a comparative table filled with the best
conditions for altruism and damaging for the models presented above.
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Altruism
Relatedness Population structure and model assumptions
r = 1N Infinite island. Weak altruism.
r = 1N Stepping-stone. Weak altruism.
r = 0 Infinite island. Strong altruism.
r = 0 Stepping-stone. Strong altruism.
r = 1N +
N−1
N2 Infinite island. Altruism expressed before dispersal, m→ 0.
r = 1N +
N−1
N2 Stepping-stone. Altruism expressed before dispersal, m→ 0.
r = sN+s Infinite island. Overlapping generations, m→ 0.
r = sN+s Stepping-stone. Overlapping generations, m→ 0.
r = 1 Infinite island. Population extinction with propagule mode of recolonisation,
m→ 0.
r ' 13N Infinite island. Altruism expressed only in the natal deme, Ep = 1, Em = 0
and m ' 0.5.
r = 1N Infinite island. Altruism expressed only individuals born in the same deme,
Ad = 1, Au = 0 and m→ 1.
r = − 1N−1 Panmictic population. Strong altruism.
r = N−2N−1 Panmictic population. Altruism expressed only with siblings, x→ 1.
r = 1 Panmictic population. Assortative formed groups, N very large, a → 1. The
level of assortative interaction a is independent of gene frequency.
0 < r < 1 Panmictic population. Assortative formed groups, N very large. Level of as-
sortative interactions dependent of gene frequency.
Damaging
Relatedness Population structure and model assumptions
r = 0 Infinite island. Harming anyboby after dispersal.
r = 0 Infinite island. Harming anyboby before dispersal.
r = − 1N−1 Infinite island. Harming is expressed only in foreign demes, Ep = 0 and Em = 1
and m→ 0.
r = −1 Infinite island. Harming only individuals born in different dems Ad = 0, Au = 1
and m→ 0.
r = − 1N−1 Panmictic population. Harming anyboby.
r = − 2N−1 Panmictic population. Harming only none-siblings, x→ 0.
r = −1 Panmictic population. Disassortative formed groups, N very large, a = −1.
The level of disassortative interaction a is independent of gene frequency.
−1 < r < 0 Panmictic population. Disassortative formed groups, N very large. Level of
disassortative interactions dependent of gene frequency.
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Chapter 3
Repeated interactions
Kin selection and reciprocity
In the preceding sections we dealt only with individuals interacting once per generation.
However, individuals are likely to interact repeatedly during a season, be it to reciprocate
cooperative donations or to retaliate damaging acts. The evolution of reciprocity has been
widely studied in evolutionnary biology and the social sciences, it is a well-known force pro-
moting cooperative interactions. The purpose of this chapter is twofold, first to have some
insight about the interaction between reciprocity and kin selection on the cost and benefits
of altruisitic and/or cooperative acts. Second, to parallel the result of the coevolution of al-
truism and kin recognition of Lehmann and Perrin (2002) to the coevolution of cooperation
and a memory.
Repeated interactions can be directly integrated into the payoff function (2.73) which would
yield to the interplay of kin selection and repeated interactions in a spatial context. How-
ever, for simplicity I consider a panmictic population of very large size. The probability that
an individual interacts again with a previously encountered partner is designated by ω and
the average number of rounds by n. Each round of interaction consists of two stages. First,
a donation stage occur. An actor invests IA in an act at a cost of C IA fewer offspring to
itself (investment varies between 0 and 1). The act result in the receptor having B IA more
offsprings. In the second stage of the interaction punishment might occur. The investment
into punishment IP of an actor decreases as the investment of the partner into donation
increases. An actor investing IP into punishment involves a cost of C IP fewer offspring to
itself. The punishing act result in the receptor having a damage of B IP fewer offspring (I
use B instead of D as the intensity of the damage because it greatly simplifies the notations
without loosing to much of biology). The population consists of two classes of individuals,
those of the desirable class which are related to a focal individual (FI) and those of the unde-
sirable class which are less related or unrelated. The probability of correctly identifying and
directing altruism and/or damaging non-randomly to the desirable class is x. With comple-
mentary probability (1 − x) the acts are provided randomly to members of the population
(i.e., member of the desirable and undesirable class). The probability that the FI interact
again with a previous encountered partner is designated by ω and the average number of
interaction by nr. The fitness of the FI in such a population reads
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w =
1 + xF•,d + (1− x) F•,0
1 + F0,0
, (3.1)
where 1 is the basic unit, F•,d the sum of payoffs when the FI has correctly identified and
interacted with an individual of the desirable class, F•,0 is the average sum of payoffs when
the FI has interacted randomly with a member of the population, and F0,0 the average
sum of payoffs of a randomly sampled member of the population. Assuming that costs and
benefits depend linearly on the level of investment which varies between 0 and 1 the sum of
payoffs of an individual of class i interacting repeatedly with an individual of class j reads
Fi,j =
nr∑
k=1
ωk−1
(
B
(
IAj (k, i)− IPj (k, i)
)− C (IPi (k, j) + IAi (k, j))) , (3.2)
where IAi (k, j) and I
P
i (k, j) are respectively the level of investment into an altruistic act
and a punishing act at round k of an individual of class i playing with an individual of
class j. The sum of the investments over all rounds of the game of an individual of class j
interacting with an individual of class i will be designated by IAj,i ≡
∑nr
k=1 ω
k−1 IAj (k, i) and
IPj,i ≡
∑nr
k=1 ω
k−1 IPj (k, i). Using I
B
j,i ≡ IAj,i − IPj,i and ICj,i ≡ IAj,i + IPj,i the fitness function
(3.1) can be written
w =
1 + x
(
B IBd,• − C IC•,d
)
+ (1− x) (B IB0,• − C IC•,0)
1 +B IB0,0 − C IC0,0
. (3.3)
Since the FI interact only with two classes of relatives, the measure of selection is given by
Hamilton’s rule
S =
∂w
∂z•
+
∂w
∂zd
R, (3.4)
where the relatedness R = Qd−Q01−Q0 is the genetic identity with the desirable class relative to
the average genetic identity of a randomly sampled individual in the population. Inserting
(3.3) into (3.4) yield
S ∝ x
(
B
∂Id,•
∂z•
− C ∂I•,d
∂z•
)
+ (1− x)
(
B
∂I0,•
∂z•
− C ∂I•,0
∂z•
)
+ x
(
B
∂Id,•
∂zd
− C ∂I•,d
∂zd
)
R. (3.5)
Since all derivatives are evaluated at (z• = zd = z0 = z), we use
∂I•,p
∂z•
≡ ∂Ij,i∂zj and
∂Ip,•
∂z•
≡ ∂Ii,j∂zj for all i and j. The first derivative is the change of the sum of investments
of an individual from a class relative to a change of his own behaviour, (i.e, the individuals
marginal investment). The second derivative is the change of the sequence of investments of
a an individual from a class relative to a change in behaviour of an individual from another
class (i.e, the partners marginal investment). Introducing these definitions into (3.5) we get
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S ∝ x
(
B
∂I•,p
∂z•
− C ∂Ip,•
∂z•
)
R+B
∂Ip,•
∂z•
− C ∂I•,p
∂z•
. (3.6)
Defining the coefficient of reciprocity (Brown et al. 1982) to be
ρ ≡
∂Ip,•
∂z•
∂I•,p
∂z•
=
∂Ip,•
∂I•,p
. (3.7)
The coefficient of reciprocity is the response of a partner to a change of the FI trait’s value
over all rounds of interactions. This coefficient measure to what extend an act is retuned
to the donor. Note that the value of ρ as defined here might exceed one. Even unlikely,
a partner might invest ten times what the FI has invested. The purpose to define ρ is to
squeeze all the parameters defining the strategies into a single a coefficient in the vein of
the relatedness with the social neighborhood. It also has a severe limitation as it can be
defined only when costs and benefits are additive function of investment. Therefore, there
is no much biology to read in it but it facilitates the computation of the effects of actors
on fitness under these specific assumptions. With the coefficient of reciprocity in hand, the
mean selection measure can be further simplified
xR (B − C ρ) + (B ρ− C) > 0. (3.8)
The first term in the left hand side this inequality is the relatedness times the effect of
individuals of the desirable class on the fitness of the FI. The second term in the left hand
side of the inequality is the effect of the FI on its own fitness. Despite the fact that cost and
benefits are defined on a purely additive scale, there is an interaction between kin selection
and repeated interaction. The term ρR appears because a close relative of the FI is more
likely to invest into cooperation than a random member of the population. This might
trigger the response of the FI who then increases it’s own investment into cooperation at
some costs for himself. Under assortative interactions x > 0 and kin selection can boost the
investment into cooperation.
As seen in the previous chapter when the expression of the trait is homogeneous, the spatial
structure itslef has no effect on the evolution of altruism since selection depends mainly
on the effect of the FI on its fitness. For the same population structure the outcome of
cooperation is given by substituting d• = B ρ−C into (2.32) with nd →∞. More generally,
the results of the previous chapter can be directly extended to repeated interactions by
noting that r = xR is the relatedness with the social neighbourhood, then (3.9) runs
r (B − C ρ) + (B ρ− C) > 0, (3.9)
This equation is equivalent to (2.9) with new costs and benefits. Each mechanisms which
fosters altruism r > 0 facilitates the evolution of cooperation. For instance, in the presence
of overlapping generations, cooperation is enhanced through kin selection (2.45), a result
already noted by Irwin and Taylor (2000). When the relatedness with the social neighbour-
hood is zero, the measure of selection reduce to
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ρB − C > 0. (3.10)
In the remaining part of this chapter we will look at some classical mechanisms generating
a positive coefficient of reciprocity.
A fistful of strategies
Coevolution of cooperation and the memory
As in previous analyses (Killingback and Doebeli 2002, Wahl and Nowak 1999) we further
assume that the level of investment of an individual of class i at any round depends linearly
on its partner’s investment at the preceding round. The investment into altruism of the
FI depends on four traits, a response slope β• on the partner’s investment into altruism at
the preceding round (phenotypic similarity between partners), a memory m• of the partners
investment at the preceding round and an investment on the first round τ•. Given a memory,
an optimal strategy of investment into altruism is determined by an optimal initial move τ
and an optimal slope β. However, these three traits will coevolve under the action of natural
selection. When simultaneously engaged in reciprocal interactions the investments of the FI
and its partner are given by
IA• (k + 1) = m• β• I
A
0 (k) (3.11)
IA0 (k + 1) = m0 β0 I
A
• (k) (3.12)
IP• (k) = 0 (3.13)
IP0 (k) = 0, (3.14)
The initial conditions of this system of equations are given by the initial donation of both
interacting individuals IA• (1) = τ• and I
A
0 (1) = τ0. Solving these equations and substituting
into the sum of the investments over all rounds of the game in (3.3) allows to calculate (3.8).
When the number of rounds is infinite, the sum of the investments over all rounds of the
game of the FI playing with a random member of the population yield
I•,0 =
∞∑
k=1
ωk−1 IA• (k) =
τ• + ωm• β• τ0
1− ω2m0m• β0 β• , (3.15)
and
I0,• =
∞∑
k=1
ωk−1 IA0 (k) =
τ0 + ωm0 β0 τ•
1− ω2m0m• β0 β• . (3.16)
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Then, the coefficient of reciprocity say for the slope for instance evaluated at (τ• = τ0 = τ),
(m• = m0 = m) and (β• = β0 = β) reads
ρ =
∂I0,•
∂τ•
∂I•,0
∂τ•
=
∂I0,•
∂β•
∂I•,0
∂β•
= ωmβ. (3.17)
Infinite number of rounds
Assuming that the number of rounds is infinite nr → ∞ and evaluating the coefficient of
reciprocity independently for the memory, the slope and the initial donation at (m• = m0 =
m), (β• = β0 = β) and (τ• = τ0 = τ) one founds that the coefficient of reciprocity is the
same for each of the three traits and reads
ρ = β mω. (3.18)
Substituting (3.18) into (3.10) gives the condition for the evolution of cooperation. If this
condition is satisfied the memory m coevolves with the initial donation τ and the slope β.
This results parallels the finding that altruism coevolves with kin recognition (Lehmann and
Perrin 2002). As already emphasised by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) cooperation cannot
emerge in a see of defectors because (3.18) depends on a minimal level of the response
slope β > 0. To circumvent the problem of the origination of cooperation from a purely
selfish state, Axelrod and Hamilton proposed to introduce kin selection into the equation.
Inserting (3.18) into (3.9) and setting β = 0 one can see that the slope can evolve from
a state were their value is zero under the condition that individuals have an amount of
memory . Under these condition the evolution of the behaviours is obtained from (3.9) if
r > 0. The behaviours are altruistic until the value of the slope and/or the memory evolved
high enough in order to satisfy (3.10), at that point the behaviour becomes cooperative.
Finite number of rounds
The previous sections assumed that the number of rounds is infinite. However, in practice
the number of rounds is finite and it is useful to know how many rounds is required for
cooperation to emerge. Under the present assumptions, it turns out that three rounds are
necessary to foster cooperation. This can be understood as follow. If there is only one round,
individuals are caught in the Prisoner’s dilemma. If there are two rounds each individual can
reciprocate the partner’s move, raise the stack so to say, but it is still better to defect because
individuals do not now with certainty whether the partners will reciprocate. By contrast,
if there are three rounds of interactions both individuals go through a whole iteration of
reciprocal donation with their partner so that they know its intention. Therefore, it seems
that three rounds of interaction are necessary to collect the relevant information to respond
the partner’s move. Further, as can be seen from fig.(3.1) once the threshold of three rounds
is passed, the coefficient of reciprocity rapidly converge to its asymptotic value.
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Figure 3.1: Coefficient of reciprocity ρ as a function of the number of rounds in the game
nr. Stars with ω = 0.5, m = 0.5, β = 0.5 and τ = 0.5. Diamonds with ω = 1, m = 1,
β = 0.5 and τ = 0.5.
Coevolution of Cooperation and punishment
The idea that punishment might foster the evolution of cooperation has a long history, for
review see Frank (2003). Beside kin selection and reciprocity it is maybe the third major force
promoting cooperation. The model presented below completes the analysis for the article in
preparation with Laurent Keller on the classification of models sustaining altruism and/or
cooperation. Here I derive the coevolution of cooperation and punishment. The essence of
coercion or punishment is to impose a fine on defectors so that the temptation to defect is
no longer rewarded. A fraction or the benefits are retrieved from an individual which does
not cooperate and by cooperating individuals counter the negative effect of punishment.
The investment into punishment of the focal actor will depend upon a single trait, the
response slope p• on the partner’s level of defection which is one minus the investment into
cooperation. The benefits of punishment are assumed to flow back to the punisher through
an increase in cooperation of the partner in subsequent rounds. It is also assumed that
the response to punishment is a trait under selection. Therefore, let us designates l• as
the probability that the FI invests into cooperation according to the level of punishment of
its partner at the preceding round. A positive value of l• means that the FI responds to
punishment by investing into cooperation, this will reduce future deleterious acts on the FI.
I also define β• as the response slope of the FI on its own level of investment into cooperation
at the preceding round. This trait and l both determine the FI’s level of cooperation. Then,
the investments of the FI and a player randomly sampled from the population simultaneously
engaged in reciprocal interactions involving punishment are given by
IA• (k + 1) = β• I
A
• (k) + l• I
P
0 (k) (3.19)
IA0 (k + 1) = β0 I
A
0 (k) + l0 I
P
• (k) (3.20)
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IP• (k) = p• (1− IA0 (k)) (3.21)
IP0 (k) = p0 (1− IA• (k)) (3.22)
The initial conditions of this system of equations are given by the initial donation of both
individuals IA• (1) = τ• and I
A
0 (1) = τ0, and the initial level of punishment I
P
• (1) = p•(1−τ0)
and IP0 (1) = p0(1−τ•). Punishment directly follows cooperation. Solving the equations and
substituting the investment into (3.3), one can then calculate the gradient of selection (3.8)
with the coefficient of reciprocation as an explicit function of the parameter of the strategy.
Infinite number of rounds
Assuming that the number of rounds is infinite nr → ∞ and evaluating the coefficient of
reciprocity independently for the response to punishment l, the response slope of investment
into cooperation β and the initial donation at (l• = l0 = l), (β• = β0 = β) and (τ• = τ0 = τ)
one founds that the coefficient of reciprocity is the same for each of the three traits and
reads
ρ = p. (3.23)
Cooperation evolves only insofar the initial level of punishment satisfies pB − C > 0 and
do not depend on the probability of interacting again ω. By contrast, punishment itself
evaluated at (p• = p0 = p) depends on ω. This occurs because the benefits of punishment
which is the investment of punished individuals into cooperation only flow back to the
punisher when partners interact again:
ρ =
l ω
1− β ω . (3.24)
For punishment to evolve it is necessary that the partner responds to punishment by in-
vesting into cooperation, the value of l must exceed zero. But cooperation itself evolves
only insofar the level of punishment p exceeds zero. Therefore, for cooperation to coevolve
with punishment all traits must initially exceed a given threshold value. This conclusion is
similar to the one reached in the preceding section about the coevolution of cooperation and
the memory.
Finite number of rounds
When the number of rounds is finite the coefficient of reciprocity for the response to pun-
ishment l, the response slope β and the initial donation τ are still given by (3.23) because
punishment becomes effective already on the first round of interaction. By contrast, the
coefficient of reciprocity for punishment depends on the number of rounds, for instance in
the case of two rounds nr = 2 it reads
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ρ =
l (1− τ) ω
1− τ + ω (1− 2 p l (1− τ)− β τ) . (3.25)
From this is equation it can be seen that when the initial move τ increases, the coefficient
of reciprocity decrease. High initial levels of cooperation decrease the benefits of punishing
partners (Frank, 2003). The denominator of (3.25) is the marginal increase of investment
into the benefits of punishment and the numerator is the marginal increase of investment into
the costs of punishment. Note that when β increases, the coefficient of reciprocity increases.
This occurs because when individuals continuously cooperate over successive rounds the cost
of punishment decreases. An assumption of the model is that the cost of punishment are paid
one round before the benefits are received. Therefore, increasing β reduces a lot the marginal
investment into the costs without affecting the marginal investment into the benefits. But
this independence no longer holds if there are more than two rounds. The coefficient of
reciprocity for punishment also rapidly converge to its asymptotic value, fig.(3.2).
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Figure 3.2: Coefficient of reciprocity ρ as a function of the number of rounds in the game n.
Stars with ω = 0.5, m = 0.5, p = 0.5, β = 0.5 and τ = 0.5. Diamonds with ω = 1, m = 1,
p = 0.5, β = 0.5 and τ = 0.5
Chapter 4
Conclusion
The main aim of this thesis was to illustrate the importance of recognition for the evolution
of altruism and/or cooperation. A conclusion is that altruism coevolves with kin recognition
(Lehmann and Perrin 2002) and that cooperation coevolves with the memory (chapter 3).
More generally, different models concerning altruism, spite and cooperation where rewritten
or developed in order to be able to draw some comparisons. For this purpose, the fecundity
costs and benefits were assumed to depends linearly on the social phenotype. In the absence
of demographic stochasticity, the direction of selection on the trait under consideration can
be written as:
r (B − C ρ) + (B ρ− C) > 0. (4.1)
Where r is the relatedness with the social neighborhood and measure to what extend in-
dividuals are more related in social than in competitive interactions (Queller 1992). This
parameter takes into account different variable of the life-cycle as for instance survival, dis-
persal, recognition or patch size. The coefficient of reciprocity ρ measure to what extend an
act is retuned to the donor (Brown et al., 1982). This parameter takes into account different
variables affecting reciprocal interaction as for instance the number of rounds, the response
slope of the partner or the probability of further interactions.
Altruism
In the absence of reciprocal interactions, the direction of selection depends upon the value
of r B − C. Which are the mechanisms possibly generating r greater than zero? Candi-
date mechanisms studied in this thesis were mainly the conditionnal expression of altru-
ism through kin recognition, overlapping-generation, the timing of altruism and population
stochasticity.
The first mechanism, kin recognition has been broadly investigated in this thesis. Kin recog-
nition falls under two main categories, spatial recognition (which in my opinion includes the
overlapping generation model of Taylor and Irwin (2000)) and active recognition of indi-
viduals. This last category is composed of familiarity based recognition and phenotype-
matching. All these mechanisms lead to a consistent level of altruism and altruism can be
checked to be convergent stable. It is also clear from the analysis that the finer the recogni-
tion mechanism, the higher the level of altruism. The recognition systems might be ranked
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in decreasing efficiency as: familiarity based recognition, phenotype-matching when errors
occur, overlapping-generation and spatial recognition (see table of chapter 2). Further, it is
interesting that environnmental cues are as efficient as genetic one and that the heritability
for recognition traits might be set under disruptive selection (Lehmann and Perrin, 2002).
For the timing of altruism, it has been showed in chapter 2 than if altruistic donation occur
among juveniles before dispersal, a high level of self-sacrifice can be favoured by natural
selection. This is maybe the simplest and more robust mechanism sustaining altruism in a
group greater than a family.
When it comes to population stochasticity, this can occur by either two ways. First through
demographic stochasticity, however demographic stochasticity has only an effect on altruism
when fecundity is very weak, approximately for a number of offsprings produced per indi-
viduals ranging between 1 and 3 (model not shown here). The second way to get population
stochasticity is when sub-population get extinct through environmental disturbances. The
analysis carried out here suggest that fairly high levels of altruism can be selected for if
the individuals recolonising extinct patches are higly related. If this occur, altruism can be
successfully exported and invades the population.
Finally, a few word on the concept of population elasticity which is the capacity of the envi-
ronment to expand in order to accommodate extra offsprings produced by altruistic actions
(Taylor and Irwin 2000). For instance altruists might be able to increase the carrying ca-
pacity of their population by the exploitation of some new ressources. Whether this process
might yield to the spread of an altruistic gene is not easily seen because when population
size increases the genetic identity between individuals decrease. More analytical work is
required in this direction in order to asses the interplay between altruism and demography.
A conclusion is that high levels of altruism are achieved either when interaction occur among
member of a family or in the presence of a green-beard mechanism.
Damaging
An interesting feature of (4.1) is that one can directly obtain the condition for the evolution
of a damaging behaviour by substituting B for −D. In the absence of reciprocal interactions,
the direction of selection depends upon the value of −r D − C. In other words, individuals
must be more related in competitive than in social interactions (the latter being the victims).
In chapter 2 we saw that a damaging behaviour gives a positive effect on the fitness of the
behaver as long as the population is of small size. Whether the behaviour qualifies as
spite or damaging depends on the effect of actors on the fitness function. All things else
being equal, damaging is selfish under small population size but becomes spiteful when the
population size increase fig.(2.7) and fig.(2.12). When the patch size is small, the actor has a
direct benefit in harming neighbours due to the concomitant decrease in competition for its
offspring. However, when the patch size is large, the decrease in competition the offspring of
the FI experience stem essentially from related individuals harming dissimilar neighbours.
The investigation of different models show clearly that each time an active recognition allows
to direct preferentially altruism towards a more related class, this same mechanism can be
used to harm the less related class. Discrimination can be used for the best as for the worth.
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For instance, phenotype-matching used for altruism as well as for mating behaviour can also
serve for the purpose of acting harmfully. Thus, it seems a good idea to help relatives and
harm migrants as suggested by the extremely high level of relatedness obtained in fig.(2.11)
through phenotype-matching. High levels of spite can also be obtained through the green-
beard mechanisms which generates altruism equally well. Peace and war are the two sides
of the same coin. Note, that harming individuals through the spatial recognition where
individuals behave harmfully only in foreign demes is weak and vanishes rapidly with an
increase in the number of demes. Except the green-beard example of Keller and Ross (1998),
spite is empirically lacking (Foster et al., 2001) but the case is still not closed. It is also
interesting to note that the green-beard mechanisms might sustain high levels of spite in
a population of large size (section (4.7)). However, the deleterious behaviours of harming
neighbours might be counterselected if they affect the demography of a deme since their
advance might finally flush the population.
Cooperation
The body of work on cooperation is very large and the standard framework has been re-
smuggled in chapter 3. The only new result is that cooperation and the memory coevolves.
However it is important to reemphasis that kin selection boost cooperation as already noted
by Irwin and Taylor (2001) and suggested by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). Substituting
(3.15) into (4.1) makes it clear that a response slope β can emerge from an initial value of
zero only in the presence of some kin selection effect.
As an overall conclusion, by the variety of mechanisms leading to altruism and/or co-
operation the conditionnal expression of a behaviour is very important. The fine tune of
conditionnal behaviours requires cognitive devices such as a sophisticated memory, the abil-
ity to detect cheater and the acquisition of knowledge about the partner. This raises the
interesting question of the coevolution between cognition, culture and cooperation. Another
interesting question would by the evolution of a reaction norm of altruism with respect to
different classes of relatives under non-additive costs and benefits (sibs, half-sibs, cousins,
...). Ass ever, Hamilton’s rule reigns beyond sociality, gravitating and beautiful.
56 Chapter 4. Conclusion
Appendix
1.Tracking the lumpy components
In this section I compare some result presented in the main text with those of Perrin and
Lehmann (2001) (spatial recognition model) and Lehmann and Perrin (2001) (phenotype
matching model). I believe that we incorrectly computed the competitive neighbourhood,
our term mpj in both articles. Fortunately, the discrepancies are not heavily qualitative.
Spatial recognition
In order to compare the results with Perrin and Lehmann (2001) it is worth having a look
at the selective pressures in the infinite island limit for the model described in section (4.4)
of chapter (2). The effect of the FI on its fitness is given by
∂w
∂z•
= − (C ((1−m)Ep +mEm))− (1−m)
2 (B − C) ((1−m)Ep +mEm)
N
, (4.2)
and the effect of individual from the natal deme of the FI on its fitness reads
∂w
∂z0
= Ep (1−m)2
(
B − (1−m)
2 (B − C) (N − 1)
N
)
. (4.3)
These equations are not directly comparable to equ.(5b) and equ.(5c) of Perrin and Lehmann
(2001) because their model is constructed from the point of view of a focal juvenile. However,
their result should be equivalent to the present one because juveniles are actors on a focal’s
parental gene lineage. Despite this necessity, the total selective pressure on altruism equ.(5.d)
of Perrin and Lehmann (2001) is not equivalent to the present model. This occurs because
the average productivity of the natal deme mpj of the focal juvenile has been incorrectly
computed and kin competition is underestimated. The term mpj can be reconsidered by
spliting the production of competing juveniles into two different classes of actors, the mother
of the focal juvenile and the different mothers. Then, the number of competing juveniles
produced by the parental generation in the natal deme of the focal juvenile would read
mpj = 1 + (B − C)
(
(1−m)
N
z• +
N − 1
N
((1−m)2 z0 + (1−m) mz1
)
, (4.4)
where m ≡ (1 − k) in Perrin and Lehmann (2001). The first term in the brackests counts
the fraction 1/N of juveniles produced by the mother of the focal juvenile (she expressed the
altruistic behavior only when resident). The second term in the brackets counts the number
of competing juveniles produced by different mothers, including the females from the natal
deme of the focal’s juvenile mother and migrant females. The term (1−m)2 is the probability
that the mother of the focal juvenile and a female related to her remaind philopatric (i.e,
the probability that the mother has been helped by an individual with phenotype z0). Using
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(4.4) into their model, evaluating selection between an allele that expresses the behavior and
a selfish allele, we recover (4.2) and (4.3) when Ep = 1 and Em = 1. Had we used (1−m)3
instead of (1−m)2 in (4.4) and setting z1 = 0, the equation simplifies to
mpj = 1 + (B − C) (1−m) z0, (4.5)
which is the form used by Perrin and Lehmann (2001). This equation differs by a factor
(1 − m) with (4.4). This ”slight” modification changes the result both qualitatively and
quantitatively. In fig.(4.1) the relatedness with the social neighborhood issued from both
approaches are compared in the infinite island model of dispersal. Qualitatively the correct
relatedness is a concave function of philopatry. Quantitatively it gets about half the value
as predicted in the best situation for the altruism. Hence, spatial recognition is not so good
in sustaining altruism.
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Figure 4.1: Relatedness with the social neighborhood r in the infinite island model plotted
as a function of the level of philopatry (1−m) when altruism is expressed only by philopatric
individuals (Ep = 1 and Em = 0) with N = 5. The accelareting curve is the relatedness
obtained from Perrin and Lehmann (2001) when selection is evaluted between an allele
expressing the altruistic trait and an allele with phenotype za = 0, gentic identities are then
indenpendent of the trait under selection and their calculations simplifies. The remaining
curve is relatedenss as obtained from the present setting.
Phenotype matching
In order to compare this result with those of Lehmann and Perrin (2002) it is worth having
a look at the selective pressures in the infinite island model of dispersal. The effect of the
FI on its fitness is
∂w
∂z•
= −C ((1−m)2Ad + (1− (1−m)2) Au)
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− (1−m)
2 (B − C) ((1−m)2Ad + (1− (1−m)2) Au)
N
, (4.6)
and the effect of individual from the natal deme of the FI on its fitness reads
∂w
∂z0
= B (1−m)2Ad − (1−m)
4 (B − C) ((1−m)Ad +mAu) (N − 1)
N
. (4.7)
As done in section on spatial recognition it is possible to rewrite the competitive neigh-
borhood of Lehmann and Perrin (2002) in order to match the selective pressures (4.6) and
(4.7). However, by contrast to spatial recognition the differences between both models is
attenuated. In fig.(4.9) the relatedness with the social neighborhood r issued from both
approaches are compared. Further, using explicit function of costs and benefits which also
affect the dynamics of relatedness and letting altruism coevolve with dispersal reduces the
quantitative differences between both approaches (not shown here). In conclusion, despite
the incorrect competitive neighborhood, the results of Lehmann and Perrin (2002) converge
qualitatively and quantitavely to the present setting. The main difference with the origi-
nal formalization where altruism is a monotonic increasing function of philopatry is that
the recycled models indicate that altruism is in fact a concave function of philopatry. The
highest level of altruism is obtained at some intermediate value of philopatry. Intuitively
this can be understood as follow, at low levels of philopatry individual can exports all the
benefits of altruism, by contrast at high levels of philopatry the benefits are increasingly
destroyed through kin competition. Since the benefits of altruism are increasing in the
level of philopatry, a trade off-balance the two counteracting force of helping-kin and kin
competition.
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Figure 4.2: Relatedness with the social neighborhood r in the infinite island model under
plotted as a function of the level of philopatry (1 −m) when Ad = 0.95, Au = 0.5, N = 5.
The concave curve is the relatedness obtained from the present setting. The remaining
curve is relatedenss as obtained from Lehmann and Perrin (2002) when selection is evaluted
between an allele expressing the altruistic trait and an allele with phenotype za = 0.
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2. Coancestry
2.1 Male´cot’s one dimensional lattice
Recurence equations for genetic identity by descent between individuals (coancestry) can be
derived at each step of a life cycle. I focus here at coancestry between juveniles and adults
which is equivalent to derive coancestry before and after dispersal. The model needs only
the coancestries at equilibrium so that I neglect time indices. Consider haploid creatures
leaving in patches of size N . The identity between two different adults randomly sampled
after dispersal in the same deme can be expressed as a function of the identity between
juveniles before dispersal just after reproduction
QD0 =
∑
i
∑
j
mimi−j Qj , (4.8)
where mj is the dispersal probability at distance j and Qj is the identity between two
randomly sampled juveniles at j steps. The identity between two juveniles sampled in the
same deme is Q0 = γ
(
1
N +
N−1
N Q
D
0
)
where γ = (1−µ)2 is the probability that no mutation
occured. Two juveniles sampled in different demes at distance k just after reproduction
cannot coalesce in a common ancestor, their identity is Qk = γ QDk . More generaly, the
identity between two adults randomly sampled at k steps after dispersal is
QDk =
∑
i
∑
j
mimi−j Qk+j . (4.9)
To get one iteration over the life cycle we express again identity between juveniles as a
function of identity between adults, the recursion then satisfies
QDk = γ
∑
i
∑
j
mimi−j QRk+j . (4.10)
Were I used the notations of sampling with replacement equivalent to QRx = Q
D
x except
QR0 =
1
N +
N−1
N Q
D
0 . We owe this system of recurence equations to Male´cot, details and useful
results can be found in (Rousset 2003b). This system of equation will now be extended to
overlapping-generations. As in some previous analyses (Irwin and Taylor 2000) I assume that
individuals survive with probability s to the next generation and they keep their breeding
spot. Three cases can be distinguished. First, with probability s2 two randomly sampled
individuals are surviving adults from the previous generation. In this case their identity is
the identity between two adults at the previous generation whatever the distance at which
they are sampled. With probability 2 s (1 − s) one individual is a surviving adult and the
other was a juvenile which just reached adulthood. If the new adult is stem from the natal
deme of the resident, coalescence might occur between the two individuals if the former
gave birth to the latter. Further, mutation occurred during conception of the juvenile with
probability
√
γ. Finally, with probability (1− s)2 both individuals are new adults and the
identities are those as given in the finite island model of dispersal. Taking all cases into
account the identity of two adults randomly sampled at distance k runs
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QDk = s
2QDk + 2s(1− s)
∑
l
mlQ
R
k+l + (1− s)2
∑
i
∑
j
mimi−j QRk+j . (4.11)
Substituting identity between juveniles for identity between adults in the previous equation
and rearranging one get
QDk = s
2QDk + 2s(1− s)
√
γ
(∑
l
mlQ
D
k+l +mk
1−QD0
N
)
+ (1− s)2 γ
∑
i
∑
j
mimi−j QDk+j +
∑
i
mimi−k
1−QD0
N
 . (4.12)
Following classical analyses, see (?), we use the characteristic function of the dispersal
distribution ψ(z) ≡ ∑j mjei j z and the characteristic function of the identity between
two randomly sampled genes Q(z) ≡ ∑k QDk ei k z. Multiplying each side of (4.12) with
the characteristic function of gene identity and assuming that dispersal is symmetric and
rearranging we get
Q(z) =
1−QD0
N
F (z). (4.13)
Where the identity coefficient at different distances can be extracted from this equation by
taking the inverse Fourier transform of
F (z) =
ψ(z)
(
2 s
√
γ + (1− s) γ ψ(z))
1 + s
(
1− 2√γ ψ(z))− (1− s) γ ψ(z)2 . (4.14)
When s = 0, (4.13) reduces to the classical result of isolation by distance. Following the
same derivation as (?) we also note that the diversity within a deme can be related to total
population size by NT = limµ→0
(1+s)(1−QD0 )
1−γ for this model. A powerful result of Gandon
and Rousset (1999), see also (?), is that the average differentiation between demes can be
related to an inverse Fourier transform at distance zero
Dd =
m0
N
−
∑
l
ml
QD0 −QDl
1−QD0
=
1
N
L0(ψ(z)− F (z) (1− ψ(z)))
=
1
N
L0
(
(1 + s) ψ(z)− 2 (1−m) s
1 + s+ (1− s) ψ(z)
)
. (4.15)
The second equality is obtained letting γ → 1 and following the same rational as Gandon
and Rousset (1999) to derive their equ.(A.13), L0 is the inverse Fourier transform a distance
zero. The last equality is obtained by inserting (4.14). When the number of demes is infinite
L0 = 1pi
∫ pi
0
(ψ(z) − F (z) (1− ψ(z))) dz. When migration follows a geometric distribution
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g(j) = q (1− q)j−1 the characteristic function of migration is obtained as follow (Remind
that a fraction 1−m of individuals stays philopatric, the remaining individual are splitted
into those individuals moving clockwise and those moving counterclokwise)
ψ(z) = (1−m) ei z 0 + m
2
 ∞∑
j=1
ei z j g(j) +
∞∑
j=1
e−i z j g(j)

= (1−m) + m
2
(
q
(e−i z − (1− q)) +
q
(ei z − (1− q))
)
= 1−m
(
1− q (cos(z)− (1− q))
1 + (1− q)2 − 2 (1− q) cos(z)
)
. (4.16)
The first equality is obtained by definition, the second equality using the standard result
of the characteristic function of the geometric distribution and the third equality follows
by transforming the exponential into cosinus function easily done by Lord Mathematica.
Substituting (4.16) into (4.15) we obtain the value of the coefficient Dd for the model of
section (4.1) in chapter (2) which reads Dd =
(1−s)
(
4 q+m (1+q)
( √
(−1+q)2 (1+s)√
(1+q) (1+q−m (1−s))
−2
))
2N (4 q−m (1+q) (1−s)) .
2.2 Wright’s island model
The finite island model of dispersal can be recovered from (4.12) by assuming that dispersal
is random in respect to which patch is reached (Nagylaki, 1983). Nevertheless, I still derive
the finite island model of dispersal with overlapping generations. As in the previous section,
surviving adults are assumed to keep their breeding spot. We need only to consider the
identity between two individuals sampled from the same deme QD0 and from two different
demes QR1 . Two probabilities are usefull to calculate the recurence equations for these two
identities. First, the probability that two genes randomly sampled in the same deme after
dispersal stem from the same deme before dispersal
qs = (1−m)2 + m
2
nd − 1 . (4.17)
The complement to this probability is given by
1− qs = 2 (1−m)m+m2 nd − 2
nd − 1 . (4.18)
The elements of both of these terms are found in (2.40). Now consider the probability that
two genes randomly sampled in different demes after dispersal stem from the same deme
before dispersal
qd = 2m (1−m) 1
nd − 1 +m
2 nd − 2
(nd − 1)2 . (4.19)
.
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And the complement to this probability is given by
1− qd = 2m (1−m) (nd − 2)
nd − 1 +m
2
(
1− nd − 2
(nd − 1)2
)
. (4.20)
The elements of both of these terms are found in (2.41). With these definitions the identity
between two adults sampled in the same deme is
QD0 = s
2QD0 + 2 (1− s) s
√
γ
(
(1−m)QR0 +mQR1
)
+ (1− s)2 γ (qsQR0 + (1− qs)QD1 ) .
(4.21)
First, with probability s2 both sampled individuals are surviving adults from the previous
generation in which case their identity is the identity between two adults. With probability
2 s (1− s) one individual is a surviving adult and the other is a new adult. If the new adult
is a resident, coalescence might occur between the two individuals if the former gave birth
to the latter. The mean identity between these two individuals is thus QR0 . If the new adult
is a migrant, the identity is given by QR1 . Finally, with probability (1− s)2 both individuals
are new adults and the identities are those as given in the finite island model of dispersal.
The identity between two randomly sampled adults in different demes runs
QR1 = s
2QR1+2 (1− s) s
√
γ
(
m
nd − 1 Q
R
0 + (1−
m
nd − 1)Q
R
1
)
+(1− s)2 γ (qdQR0 + (1− qd)QR1 ) .
(4.22)
Solving the recursions, we can calculate the different relatedness measures for the models
in the main text. For instance, the measure of relatedness from the point of view of adult
phenotype is also the Fst calculated after dispersal and reads
RD0 = lim
µ→0
QD0 −QR1
1−QR1
=
1 + s− nd (qs (1− s) + 2 (1−m) s)
1 + s− nd (qs (1− s)− 2 (1−m) s (N − 1) +N (1 + s− qs (1− s))) ,(4.23)
this reduces in the infinite island model nd →∞ to
RD0 = Q
D
0
=
(1−m) (1−m (1− s) + s)
1 +m (N − 1) (2−m (1− s)) + s . (4.24)
Further, when individuals are annual, i.e, s = 0
QD0 =
(1−m)2
1 +m (2−m) (N − 1) . (4.25)
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2.3 Sib none-sib splitting
As we have already encountered, the identity between two randomly sampled individuals
with replacement in a population of N adults reads
QR0 =
1
N
+
N − 1
N
QD0 (4.26)
The identity between two different individuals expressed over one iteration of the life cycle
in a single panmictic population is
QD0 = γ
(
1
N
+
N − 1
N
QD0
)
(4.27)
Where 1/N is the probability that two individuals come from the same parent. The equation
can be split into the identity between siblings and none-siblings
QD0 =
1
N
Qs +
N − 1
N
Qns (4.28)
The identity among siblings is Qs = γ, wherease the identity among none siblings reads
Qns = γ QD0 with Q
D
0 =
γ
N+(1−N) γ solved from (2.114). These quantities allows us to
calculate the following measures of relatedness
Rs = lim
µ→0
Qs −Qns
1−Qns
=
N − 1
N
(4.29)
and
Rns = lim
µ→0
Qns −Qs
1−Qs
= −N. (4.30)
3. Selection measure for temporary group formation
3.1 The model
In this section I derive the first order effect of selection on gene frequency change E
(
d∆pt
dδ
)
to
obtain a measure of selection when groups are temporarely formed in a finite population. I re-
smuggle the derivation of Rousset (2003a) and apply it to the present setting. Consider that
groups of size n are formed each generation right after regulation. The expected frequency
of the A allele in the total population is the sum over all types of group over the number
of groups of a given type of the expected number of adult offspring wij produced by an A
parent, times the number pij n of A parents in group i of type j, divided by the total number
of juveniles reaching adulthood N . Collecting terms yields
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E(pt+1) =
n∑
j=0
nj∑
i=1
wij pij n
nng
, (4.31)
where the total number of adultsN = nng is the number of individuals per group n times the
number of groups ng. The number of groups of type j is designated by nj . All groups of type
j are constituted of j altruists, so we have pij = jn , independent of i so that wij ≡ wj . The
number of groups of type depends on the distribution of group types given by fj(pt) which
is a function of the frequency of the A allele in the parental generation, thus nj = ng fj(pt).
With this we obtain
E(pt+1) =
n∑
j=0
wj
j
n
fj(pt). (4.32)
Using a Taylor expansion of fitness of first order around a mutation of small magnitude
δ → 0, dropping terms of higher one can write wj = δ dwjdδ + 1. Inserting this equation into
(4.32), rearranging and taking the derivative of gene frequency change over one generation
with respect to the mutation
E
(
d∆pt
dδ
)
=
n∑
j=0
dwj
dδ
j
n
fj(pt). (4.33)
The fitness function wj depends on the behaviour of the focal individual, the behaviour of
individual in his group and the population average behaviour of individuals. Expanding the
derivative of fitness with respect to mutation and excluding the focal individual from the
social interactors (zDj = δ
j−1
n−1 , z
R
0 = δ pt)
dwj
dδ
=
∂wj
∂z•
∂z•
∂δ
+
∂wj
∂zDj
∂zDj
∂δ
+
∂wj
∂zR0
∂zR0
∂δ
=
∂wj
∂z•
+
∂wj
∂zDj
j − 1
n− 1 +
∂wj
∂zR0
pt. (4.34)
Assuming that there are no specific group effects on fitness, the ∂wj
∂zD
j
are independent of the
j number of altruist in the group and inserting (4.34) into (4.33) yields
E
(
d∆pt
dδ
)
=
∂wj
∂z•
n∑
j=0
j
n
fj(pt) +
∂wj
∂zDj
n∑
j=0
j
n
j − 1
n− 1 fj(pt) +
∂wj
∂zR0
pt
n∑
j=0
j
n
fj(pt)
=
∂wj
∂z•
µ1(pt)
n
+
∂wj
∂zDj
µ2(pt)− µ1(pt)
n (n− 1) +
∂wj
∂zR0
µ1(pt)
n
pt
=
∂wj
∂z•
pt +
∂wj
∂zDj
µD2 (pt) +
∂wj
∂zR0
p2t (4.35)
The expected change in gene frequency over one generation depends upon the first an second
moment of the number of A alleles within groups, using standard notations the i′s moment
Appendix 65
is given by µi =
∑n
j=0 j
i fj(pt) (Johnson et al., 1992), this yields the second equality. The
third equality is obtained by assuming that the expected number of copies of the A allele
in a group is equal to the population mean gene frequency times the size of the group
µ1 = n pt and µD2 (pt) =
µ2(pt)−µ1(pt)
n (n−1) is the probability of sampling two A alleles in a group
without replacement. The distribution of group types is conditioned on both the actual
gene frequency in the population and on the ability of individuals to form groups with
similar or dissimilar partners. Therefore, the recognition mechanisms used by individuals
will determine µD2 (pt). In a population of small size with only a few individuals of a given
type, all possible group sizes will not be realised. To assess the exact distribution of group
size is beyond my powers so I will use approximations.
3.2 Assortative group formation independent on gene frequency
If the ability of individuals to form group is independent of the actual gene frequency in the
population one can use:
µD2 (pt) = a pt + (1− a) pt
ptN − 1
N − 1 . (4.36)
Where a is the level of assortative group formation. Substituting (4.36) into (4.35) gives
E
(
d∆pt
dδ
)
=
∂wj
∂z•
pt +
∂wj
∂zDj
(
a pt + (1− a) pt ptN − 1
N − 1
)
+
∂wj
∂zR0
p2t
= −
(
N (1− a)
N − 1
∂wj
∂zDj
+
∂wj
∂zR0
) (
pt − p2t
)
. (4.37)
The second equality is obtained by the property that ∂wj∂z• is minus the sum of the two other
partial derivatives. This shows that selection is frequency independent when recognition is
frequency independent. Plugging (4.37) into (2.1), squeezing gene frequency into coefficients
of identity as in Rousset (2003) one can write the measure of selection as
S =
∂wj
∂z•
+
∂wj
∂zDj
Qg +
∂wj
∂zR0
QR0 . (4.38)
The identity in state coefficient Qg measures the identity of individuals within groups and
reads:
Qg = a+ (1− a)QD0 . (4.39)
The first term is the level of assortative interactions weighted by a genetic identity of one.
The second term is the complement to the level of assortative interactions and is weighted by
QD0 which is the average genetic identity in the population by sampling individuals without
replacement. Assuming that the population is very large relative to group size N >> n
one might for instance use the Polya distribution (appendix 4) to model assortative group
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formation, then a = α−1n+α−1 is a function of group size. The parameter a can take values
between minus one and one a ∈ [−1, 1] depending on α ∈ [0,∞] and n ∈ [2,∞]. But
Qg ∈ [0, 1] and takes values all around QD0 .
3.3 Assortative group formation dependent on gene frequency
When the ability of individuals to form group is dependent of the actual gene frequency
in the population the two cases of assortative and disassortative group formation must
distinguished. I will consider only disassortative group formation and assume that the
ability of individuals to group with dissimilar partner decrease as the gene frequency of the
allele under consideration increases. We can then use
µD2 (pt) = p
2
t
ptN − 1
N − 1 (4.40)
as the probability of sampling two different individuals which both bear the A allele within
the same group when disassortative interaction occur. There is no biological relevance
behind this choice but it only says that the frequency of interaction between dissimilar
individuals decrease as the frequency of the A allele increases in the population. However,
the frequency of interaction between dissimilar individuals is lower than random which is
given by pt ptN−1N−1 . Substituting (4.40) into (4.35) gives
E
(
d∆pt
dδ
)
= −
(
N
N − 1
(
p2t − p3t
) ∂wj
∂zDj
+
(
pt − p2t
) (∂wj
∂zDj
+
∂wj
∂zR0
))
(4.41)
Gene frequency change over one generation is no longer frequency dependent. From (2.1)
the expectation over the neutral process of gene frequency change over one generation is
E◦
(
E
(
d∆pt
dδ
))
= −
(
N
N − 1E
◦ (p2t − p3t ) ∂wj∂zDj + E◦ (pt − p2t )
(
∂wj
∂zDj
+
∂wj
∂zR0
))
= − 1
N − 1
((
QR0 (t)−QR3 (t)
) ∂wj
∂zDj
+
(
1−QR0 (t)
) (∂wj
∂zDj
+
∂wj
∂zR0
))
. (4.42)
Where QD0 (t) ≡ E◦(p2t )/N = 1 −
(
N−1
N
)t+1
is the identity of two randomly sampled genes
with replacement at time t. The identity of three genes randomly sampled with replacement
at time t is QR3 (t) = 1 − 32
(
N−1
n
)t+1
+ 12
(
(N−2) (N−1)
N2
)t+1
. The effect of selection on gene
frequency change is graphed in fig.(4.3) as a function of the number of generation since
the appearance of a single harmful allele with initial frequency 1/N for the fitness function
(2.88). During the first generations the allele is counter-selected but the effect of selection
becomes positive in subsequent generations. The overall evolutionary balance is given by
(2.1) and is positive. The relatedness with the social neighbourhood for this model reads
r = N
2
3N2−5N+2 and does not vanish when the size of the population becomes infinite, then
r = 13 .
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Figure 4.3: Effect of selection on gene frequency change over one generation E◦
(
E
(
d∆pt
dδ
))
as a function of time for the advance of a damaging allele. When t = 0 only the FI bears the
mutant allele. Selection counters the spread of the damaging allele in the first generations.
By contrast, when the allele becomes frequent with the help of drift it is favoured by natural
selection in subsequent generations. Parameter values D = 0.8, C = 0.2 and N = 300.
4. The Polya distribution
To model assortative group formation one might use the Polya distribution (Johnson et al.,
1992) which covers the whole range from perfect assortative to complete disassortative inter-
actions. Consider a urn of size n with a frequency pt of A alleles, this is the same frequenca
as in the population. Individuals are sampled one at a time to form groups of size n. Once
the first A allele has been sampled with probability pt we return α A alleles to the urn, the
probability of sampling a second A now depends on the parameter α, which will determine
assortativee group formation. If α = 1, the probability of sampling a second A allele is
independent of the previous draw, it is again pt and the distribution of group types reduces
to the binomial distribution. If α > 1, independence breaks and the probability of sampling
a second A is greater than pt and a repetition of the procedure creates a contagion which
is equivalent to assortment. Note that the procedure doesn’t cheat gene frequency, if the
frequency of A types is low it is unlikely than there many groups with A genes but it is
likely that A will be grouped with other A alleles, fig.(4.4). When α = ∞ a focal altruist
individual will be surrounded only by other altruist in his group. If α < 1 we have disassor-
tative interactions. The probability distribution of groups consisting of j altruist given that
the frequency of altruist in the population is pt at time t reads
fj(pt) =
(
n
j
)∏j−1
i=0 (n pt + i (α− 1))
∏n−j−1
i=0 (n (1− pt) + i (α− 1))∏n−1
i=0 (n+ i (α− 1))
(4.43)
This distribution is a slightly modified version from Johnson et all. (1992, p.245). If α =
0 we obtain perfect disassortative interactions. The distribution reduces to the classical
hypergeometric with no variance because all individuals in the urn will be sampled at the
end. The first and second moments are obtained from Johnson et all. (1992, equ.6.35) and
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read with the present notations
µ1 =
n∑
j=0
j fj(pt) = n pt, (4.44)
and
µ2 =
n∑
j=0
j2 fj(pt) = n2
(
α
n+ α− 1 pt +
n− 1
n+ α− 1 pt
2
)
. (4.45)
Note that µ2 − µ1 = (n− 1) n
(
α−1
n+α−1 pt +
n
n+α−1 pt
2
)
and the variance reads
V ar(j) = µ2 − µ12 = n
2 α (1− pt) pt
n+ α− 1 (4.46)
This variance takes it’s highest value under perfect assortative interactions, V ar(j) =
n2 (1− pt) pt. Under perfect dissarsotative interactions, the variance is null, V ar(j) = 0.
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of the number of altruist per group under various level of assortment.
The frequency of the altruistic allele is set to p = 0.3. The plain line is obtained under
random group formation, i.e. binomial distribution, α = 1. The dashed line is obtained
under assortative group formation, α = 40. Similar genes are clumped together such that
the distribution becomes bimodal. The remaining line describes disassortative interactions
under α = 0.2. The variance of the distribution decreases.
5. Hawks and Doves
As an aside, I derive the probability of playing the strategy with payoff given by (2.73) for
the lattice model. Treating Ai,j ≡ Ai as the probability that class j plays the strategy. The
fecundity of the FI is given by
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f• = 1 +A•
(
AD0 R+
(
1−AD0
)
S
)
+ (1−A•)
(
AD0 T +
(
1−AD0
)
P
)
, (4.47)
where A• is the probability that the FI plays the game and AD0 is the probability that
different individuals play the game. Remind that (2.32) is given in terms of effect of actors
on the fitness of the FI. We can use this result by substituting d• = ∂f•∂A• and d0 =
∂f•
∂AD0
into (2.32) with the partial derivatives evaluated at (A• = AD0 = A). Canceling (2.32) and
solving for the probability of playing the strategy
A =
(N nd − 2) P − (N nd − 1) S + T
(N nd − 2) (P +R− S − T ) . (4.48)
This equation reduces to the classical result A = P−SP+R−S−T when nd →∞ (Frank 1998).
Consider the outcomes of the interaction as those given by the Hawk-Dove game R ≡ B−D2 ,
S ≡ B, T ≡ 0 and P ≡ B2 ) where D is the damage from escalating (Maynard-Smith 1980).
Substituting these outcomes into (4.48), the probability of playing Hawk runs
A =
BN nd
D (N nd − 2) . (4.49)
We can see that Hawks are even better off in a population of small size.
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